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Bulgaria is in the midst of a historic transforma-  In Bulgaria as in the other countries of
tion from a planned to a market economy. The  Central and Eastem Europe, defining real
Bulgarian government is working steadily to  property rights and creatinig  the conditions for
create a legal framework in which the private  free and fair competition are the most conten-
sector can develop. Many new laws - including  tious and confused legal areas because they tred
a new constitution and new laws on companies,  so heavily on vested interests. Other areas of law
foreign investment, and competition - have  are less of a problem.
been adopted over the past two years, and more
are now being drafted and debated. Bulgaria's  But the administrative and judicial machin-
pre-war legal framework was quite modem for  ery %i  implementing those laws is slower to
its time, and re. -t  of these new laws draw on  develop. Laws by themselves are only paper, the
pre-war Bulgarian tradition.  legal framework comes to life only when legal
and administrative institutions can enforce the
Gray and lanachkov describe the current  laws and readily resolve the disputes they
legal framework in Bulgaria in the areas of  inevitably spur, and only when the public accepts
constitutional, real property, intellectual prop-  that the laws are binding. Moreover, the laws by
erty, company, foreign investmenit,  bankruptcy,  necessity provide only a general framework.
contract, and antimonopoly law. These areas of  Their content must be filled by more detailed
law define property rights, the means for ex-  regulations and practice in individual cases, a
changing property rights, and the rules for  process that takes time. The challenge of legal
competitive market behavior-  the bedrock of a  development is as immense as that of economic
legal system for a market economy.  reform, and the two are inexorably intertwined.
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Bulgaria's  Evolving  Leal  Framework
for  Private  Sector  DeveloDment
Bulgaria's  economy  is in  the  midst  of a  historic  tranoformation  from  plan
to  market. Stimulating  the  growth  of  a  vibrant  and  productive  private  sector--
through  both  privatization  of  existing  public  enterprises  and  the  growth  of  new
private  companies--is  one  of  the  most  important  challenges  Bulgaria  faces  in  this
transformation.  Any  economy  needs  "ruleso  of  the  game"  to  function. While  thase
rules  derived  primarily  from  the  central  planning  bureaucracy  during  Bulgaria's
socialist  period,  a private  economy  depends  heavily on  a decentralized  legal
system  to create  and enforce  such  rules.  Thus,  developing  the  private  sector
requires  a sound  legal  framework  and supporting  legal  institutions.
This paper describes  the current  legal  framevwork  in Bulgaria  in several
areas--including  constitutional,  real  property,  intellectual  property,  company,
foreign  investment,  bankruptcy,  contract,  and antimonopoly  law.'  These  areas
of law  serve  to define  (i)  property  rights,  (ii)  the  means  to  exchange  them,  and
(iii)  the rules for competitive  market  behavior.  In essence they form the
2 bedrock  of a legal  systems  for  a  market  economy.
Bulgaria  has  made  imprespive  strides  over  the  past  two  years  to  enact  laws
designed  to support  a  market  economy. There  is,  howevar,  still  a long  way  to  go
in  formulating  a  comprehensive  legal  framework  and  in  creating  and  strengthening
the legal institutions  needed  to implement  it.  As in the other countries  of
Central  and  Eastern  Europe  (CEE),  defining  real  property  rights  and  creating  the
conditions  for free and fair competition  are  perhaps  the  most contentious  and
confused  legal  areas--iargely  because  they tred so heavily  on existing  vested
interests.  Other  areas  of  law,  including  intellectual  property,  company,  foreign
investment,  and  contract  law,  are  less  problematic.
1  This paper is  part of a larger  research  project  sponsored  by CECSE  and
LEGEC to study evolving legal frameworks  in Eastern Europe.  Other studies
include  Gray et.al.,  The Legal Framework  for Private  Sector  Development  in a
Transitional  Economy:  The Case of Polane,  World Bank WPS 800; Gray et.al6,
Romania's  Evolving  Legal  Framework  for  Private  Sector  DeveloDment,  WPS  872;  Gray
and Stiblar,  The Evolvint  Letal Framework  for Private Sector  Development  in
Slovenia,  WPS  forthcoming,  April  1992;  and  Atiyas  et.al.,  Hungarian  Leaal  Reforms
for  the  Private  Sector.
2  This paper does not discuss  certain  other areas of law that are also
important  to  the  private  sector,  including  privatization,  banking,  taxation,  and
labor  law. Although  a critical  area  of  reform,  privatization  is  a transitional
issue,  whereas  the  paper  seeks  to  address  the  longer-term  legal  structure. The
other areas of law are omitted  due both to space limitations  and to likely
coverage  in other  World Bank  or external  studies.2
Constitutional  Law
isltorical  Bacicaround
The  Constitution  of 1879. The  first  Bulgarian  Constitution  (known  as the
Turnovo  Constitution)  was  adopted  by  the  Constituent  Assembly  of  Bulgaria  in  the
old  capital  Turnovo  in  1879. Although  it  established  a  constitutional  monarchy,  i
it contained  many democrat±c  principles  and contributed  to the creation  of
parliamentary  institutions  in the country.  Private  property,  universal  male
suffrage,  and separation  of powers  were elaborated  as basic  principles.  The
Constitution  failed,  however,  to provide  strong  checks  u5ainst authoritarian
tendencies  and  was suspended  twice  (in  1881-1883  and in 1934-1938)  and  finally
replaced  by the first  socialist  Constitution  in 1947.
The  Constitution  of 1247. The  socialist  Constitution  of 1947  created  the
legal base for the transformation  of Bulgaria  into a one-party  state  with a
centrally  planned  economy.  It  granted  public  property  extensive  protection  and
imposed  limitations  on private  property. Several  laws  adopted  pursuant  to the
Constitution removed any  remaining guarantees for  private property and
reclassified  it as "individual  property",  a category  reserved  primarily  for
residential  real estate.  Extensive nationalization  began  in  1948.  The
collectivization  of agricultural  land  into  cooperatives,  completed  in  the  early
1950s,  concluded  the  process  of transformation  of the  Bulgarian  economy  into  a
ceu..rally  planned  and  bureaucratically  regulated  system.
The Constitution  of 1971.  In 1966,  the 9th Congress  of the Bulgarian
Communist  Party  decided  to draft  a  new  Constitution  to transform  the  state  from
"a State of proletarian  dictatorship"  into an "all-people'sB  State."  This
resulted"  in the  Constitution  of 1971--the  Constitution  of "mature  socialism".
According to Article 5,  "national  sovereignty,  unity of power, democratic
centralism,  socialist  democracy,  legality  and  socialist  internationalism"  were
the  main  principles of  Bulgaria's political system.'  The  Constitution
consolidated  the role of the  Communist  Party  as the  guiding  force  in society.
Although  adopting  some seemingly  democratic  provisions,  the document  further
'  The  Bulgarian  Commurist  Party  was declared  the  leading  force  in society.
All other  traditional  Parties  were dismolved,  and the once powerful  Bulgarian
Agrarian  People's  Union  was  reduced  to  an "ally"  of  the  party  in  the  construction
of socialism.  The BAPU, however, participated  in all post-war Bulgarian
gove-nments.
'  The 12th  National  Assembly  elected  a Constitutional  Commission  in 1968,
and  a  draft  of the  new Constitution  was presented  to the  National  Assembly  on
March  30,  1971. After  one  month  of debate,  the  Constitution  was adopted  by the
National  Assembly  on May 1, 1971  and  submitted  to a national  referendum  on  May
16th.  As expected, the new Constitution  was  approved by an overwhelming
majority--officially  99.66Z  of all  votes.
' As in  most socialist  constitutions,  many  of  the  Constitutional  provisions
lacked an exact legal meaning but were rather general  political statements
repeating  basic  Marxist  theoretical  concepts.3
centralized  state  power. It  established  a  new  body,  the  State  Council,  deuigned
to be a permanent  collective  head of state,  presided  over by the Secretary
Generai  of the  Co  munist Party. Tne  forty.members  were  elected  b;'  the  National
Assaembly  and were members of the Assembly as well.  The Council had broad
legislative  powers  and  could  issue  decrees  -hen  the  Assembly  was  not  in  session--
some 350  days  a yearl  Such  decrees,  when endorsed  by the  Parliament,  held the
power  of law.  In this  way the  legislative  process  was "streamlined";  in :act,
the  legislative  power  of  the  National  Assembly  was  reduced  to  rubber-stamping  and
virtually  transferred  to  the  State  Council. The  economic  system  continued  to  be
based on the public  ownership  of the means of production,  with the aim of
preventing  the  "exploitation  of  one  human  being  by  another"  and  of  developing  the
economy  in a  planned  manner  (Article  13).
The  New  Constitution
The Constitution  of 1971  was amended  several  times  in 1990 and finally
replaced  in Jtly 1991  after  the ouster  of the communist  regime.  The present
Bulgarian Constitution6  represents  a  radical departure from its socialist
predecessors.  Most socialist  phraseology  is gone,  replaced  by democratically-
oriented  legal  principles  and  values. In general  the  new  constitution  provides
reasonable  protection  for  the  property  and  economic  rights  of individuals  and
creates  a  favorable  legal  basis  for  the  development  of  the  private  sector  for  the
first  time  since  the  end  of the  World  War II.
The  Constitution  contalns  169  Articles  organized  in ten  chapters:
(1)  General  Principles;
(2)  Fundamental  Rights  and  Obligations  of the  Citizens;
(3)  National  Assembly;
(4)  President  of the  Republic;
(5)  Council  of Ministers;
(6)  Judiclal  Power;
(7)  Local  Autonomy  (Self-government)  and  Local  Administration;
(8)  Constitutional  Court;
(9) Changes and Amendments of  the  Constitution.  Adoption of New
Constitution;  and
(10)  Coat  of Arms,  Seal,  Flag,  Anthem  and  Capital.
General  Principles.  Rights.  and  Obligations.  Chapters  1  and  2  define  the
rights  and obligations  of citizens.  The enumerated  human rights are those
accepted by most democratic  societies--including  equality before the law,
guaranty  against  arbitrary  arrest  and  imprisonment,  and freedom  of expression,
religion,  association,  and  movement. Private  property  rights  are  guaranteed,  and
private  property  is declared  inviolable  (Article  17).  It may be nationalized
only for state  and  municipal  needs,  only if those  needs cannot  be met in any
other  way, and  only  with prior  and  equivalent  compensation. Article  19  states
6  State  Gazette,  No 56,  July 13, 19914
that  the  economy  of  Bulgaria  is  based  on  free  enterprise  and  that  domestic  and
foreign  invostment  are  to  receive  equivalent  treatment.  The  law  is  obliged  to
prevent  unfair  competition  and  the  atuse  of  monopoly  power.
Article  21(1)  declares  land  to  be  a  basic  part  of  the  national  wealth  that
will  receive  special  protection  from  the  state  and  society.  Arable  land  can  be
used  only  for  agricultural  purposes,  with  conversion  to  nonag:icultural  uses  only
on an exceptional  basis  and  as strictly  regulated  by law.  Foreigners  may not
own land except  through  inheritance  (in  which case the property  must be
subsequently  transferred  to  Bulgarian  nationals)  (Article  22).' This  provision
could  deter  foreign  involvement  in the  economy  if it limits  the ability  of
foreign  lenders  to  take  security  interests  in  real  property.' 0
The  power  to tax is  more striely  limited  in the  new  Constitution  than  in
the  old  one. Article  60 obliges  all  citizens  to  the  pay  taxes  and  other  fees  as
established  by law (and only by law).  Article 84(3) then states  that "the
National  Assembly  establishes  the  taxes  and  tax rates." This is an  important
guarantee  against  the  liberal  interpretation  of similar  provisions  of  the  former
Constitution,  under  which  the  Council  of  Ministers  was authorized  to grant  tax
exemptions  and in some  cases  to set  tax  rates.
' All  mineral  deposits,  beaches,  public  roads,  bodies  of  water,  and  forests
and parks (including  archeological  sites)  of national  importance  remain  the
exclusive  property  of  the  State  (Article  18). Although  not  required,  the  state
may  establish a monopoly (witha  the possibility  of concessions  to private
operators)  over  the  railroads,  the  natonal post  and  telecommunication  networks,
nuclear  energy,  and  the  production  of  radioactive  materials,  arms  and  explosives,
and  biologically  active  substances.
8  Special  concern  for  land,  and  strict  limits  on  conversion  of  agricultural
land  to  nonagricultural  uses,  is  typical  of reforming  socialist  economies. See
Polish  Legal Framework,  Romanian  Leeal  Framework,  Slovenian  Lesal Frflewowk,
supra  note 1.
9  Foreigners  may acquire  rights  to use or build on land, and foreign
nationals  resident  in  Bulgaria  may  acquire  residential  property. Furthermore,
foreign  nationals  who  are  not  permanent  residents  in  Bulgaria  are  able  to  acquire
residential  property  if  they  obtain  permission  from  the  Ministry  of  Finance. If
the  residence  is a  house  rather  than  an apartment,  the land  on  which  the  house
sitS can also be acquired. Although  even this limited  ownership  of land by
foreigners  would appear  to contravene  the Constitution,  it has apparently  not
been contested.  Foreign-owned  companies  registered  in Bulgaria  are Bulgarian
legal  persons  and  thus  do  not  fall  under  the  Constitutional  prohibition  on land
ownership.
10 If foreigners  are  not  permitted  to own  land,  foreign  banks  will not  be
able  to foreclose  on  secured  property  and  take  possession,  but  will instead  have
to  denend  on local  auctions  (in  a relatively  thin  market)  to recover  value  from
the security  interest.  In practice,  foreign  lenders  in duch an environment
forego the  security interest altogether and  instead rely on  local bank
guarantees,  which  often  in  turn  require  explicit  or implicit  public  guarantees.5
Although  reduced  in  scope  from  those  in  the  previous  Constitutio.a,  the  new
Constitution  continues  to provide certa'in  social  guarantees,  including  free
elementary  and  secondary  education  (only  'n  public  schools)  and  free  medical  care
(Aiticles  52'and  53).11  Under  certain  conditions  (to  be elaborated  in a  later
law)  university  education  may  also  be free. 1 3 Although  appealing  from  society's
standpoint,  these  guarantees  may  prove  expensive. On economic  grounds,  a good
case  can  be  made for  some  user  charges,  particularly  for  curative  health  care  and
higher  education,  with targetted  subsidies  for  low-income  families.
13
§tIctuge of the  Dublic  sector. The old  idea  of unitary  and  indivisible
power  has  been  abandoned.  Returning  to  the  pro-war  tradition,  a  balance  of  power
among  the  unicameral  Parliament  (or  "National  Assembly"),  the  executive  branch
(or  "Government"),  and  the  judiciary  is re-established  as  a  basic  principle  of
the  Constitution. Nevertheless,  the  structure  of the  public  sector  is similar
to  that  under  the  last  version  of  the  former  Constitution,  with the  exception  of
the  judicial  sector,  which  will  be radically  restructured.
The  National  Assembly  has  one  chamber  with 240  representatives  elected  on
a  proportional  basis. Although  this  structure  is  similar  on  paper  to  that  of  the
previous  socialist  As4embly,  the role  of the  new  parliament  is  very different.
During  socialist  times,  the  Assembly  met only twice  a year for several  days,
essentially  to rubber-stamp  the  numerous  decrees  of the  former  State  Council  or
laws  prepared  under  the  supervision  of  high-ranking  officials  of the  Communist
Party. In  contrast,  the  new Assembly  is  a  full-time  institution  designed  to  have
final  authority  over  lawmaking.  Bills  can  be introduced  by the  Government  or  by
any  of the  240  members  of the  National  Assembly."'  To become  law,  a bill  must
ba approved  by a  simple  majority  of  those  present  in  the  National  Assembly  (with
'  Private  alternatives  in education  and  health  care are to be regulated
by the state.
12  This is  yet  another  unclear  provision  calling  for  further  clarification
in  a  separate  law. Though  the  law  on  education  has  not  yet  been  passed,  fees  are
already  being  collected  in some  state  and  emerging  private  universities.
"  This advice is typically given by  the World Bank to developing
countries,  where  the  annual  public  cost  of  university  students  is  on average  26
times  that  of primary  school  students,  and  where  university  students  tend  to  be
from higher-income  hoiuseholds  and are therefore  more able to pay for the
education.  It  also holds for industrialized  countries,  where university
education  is  also  more expensive  than  primary  or secondary  education. Bulgaria
should  be  careful  to  allocate  its  scarce  public  resources  to  the  sectors  with the
greatest  social  returns,  typically  primary  and secondary  education;  selective
scholarships  can be granted to university students  unable to pay tuition
themselves.
"'  The  only  exception  is  the  annual  budget  bill,  which  must  be  prepared  and
presented  by the  Government.6
a required  quorum  of a least  120)  and  signed  by the  President." 5 The  National
Assembly  must  also  authorize  all  contracts  for  public  borrowings  (Article  84)  and
ratify  all  international.  agreements  that include  financial  obligations  for the
State (Article  85).
The functions  o' the  President  (an  office  introduced  in March 1990)  are
primarily  representative  in nature.  The President  is Head of State.  After
consulting  with  parliamentary  groups,  he  proposes  as  candidate  for  Prime-minister
the person  designated  by the  biggest  parliamentary  group (Article  99).  16  The
National Assembly elects the Prime Minister and, upon hin  proposal, the
ministers,  the President  of the  National  Bank, and the heado  of other public
institutions.  The President  also calls  general  elections for the National
Assembly  and  local  authorities  and  sets  up the  dates  for  referenda  called  by  the
Assembly.
The  Council of Ministers has  executive power  in Bulgaria.  It is
responsible  for  public  order  and  national  security,  public  administration,  and
foreign  policy  (Article  105). It is  also  responsible  for  the  implementat'.on  of
the  budget  and  for  the  management  of  State  property. It  has the  right  to issue
decrees (Ordinances-HOCTaHOBIeHHf),  executive orders (pa3flOpe1AaRHR) and
decisions (pemeHHq),  based on authority  delegated  by law.  In the past the
Council  of  Ministers  used  this  delegated  legislative  power  extensively  due  to  the
generality  of  many laws. A constant  stream  of decrees,  sometimes  at odds  with
law and often  unpublished,  created  a very uncertain  legal environment. The
Government  still iSsues  many decrees  and regulations,  but the  underlying  laws
tend te have  more substance  (thus  better  confining  the scope  of decree  making
authorlty),  and  regular  publication  is the  norm.
As in other  reforming  socialist  economies,  the role  of local  authorities
in designing  and implementing  local  policy  is expanding  rapidly in Bulgaria.
F_rmerly  the  nLunicipalities  were subordinated  to the  government  and under  the
strong  influence  of local committees  of the Communist  Party.  Their property
rights were  unclear; although sometimes charged with  administering  state
property,  they  rarely  owned  property  in  their  own  name. Under  the  Constitution,
municipalities  are  for  the  first  time  supposed  to  have  clearly  defined  property
rights  and  their  own  budgets.
The  role  of  the  iudiciary.  The  new  Constitution  radically  restructures  the
judiciary.  While  repeating  previous  provisions  regarding  judicial
independence,"  it adds some important  new guarantees,  including  life tenure
"  The  President  cannot  veto a bill  but  can return  it for  reconsideration
within  15  days  after  passage. A majority  vote of all  representatives  (at  least
121  votes)  is then  required  for  the  bill to become  law.
16  If successive  candidates  are  unsuccessful  in forming  a government,  the
Parliament  must be dissolved  and  new  elections  called  within  2  months.
"  Although  judges  were  nominally  independent  and  subordinated  only  to  law
under  the  previous  Constitution,  local  party  committees  had decisive  influence
over appointment,  recall,  and  promotion.7
(after  3 years in office)  and the same immunities  accorded  a member of the
Parliament.  judges  are  to  be  appointed  by the  Supreme  Judicial  Council  (Article
130),  which  will consist  of 25  members,  of  whichk  22  will be elected  (1i  by the
National  Assembly  and  11  by  the  judicial  authorities)  and  3--the  Chairman  of the
Supreme  Cassation  Court,  the  Chairman  of  the  Supreme  Administrative  Court  and  the
Attorney  General--will  be  members  by law.
The  role  of  judicial  institutions  is  further  atrengthened  by  the  formation
of a new Constitutional  Court,  whose roles  are to rule (upon  request)  on the
constitutionality  of new  laws,'"  to provide binding interpretations  of the
Constitution,  and to rule  on the  constitutionality  of irnternational  agreements
and  their  consistency  with previous  agreements.  The  Court  has 12  members,  one-
third  elected  by the  National  Assembly,  one  third  appointed  by  the  President,  and
one-third  elected  by the  getsral  meeting  of the  judges  of the  Supreme  Cassation
Court  and  Supreme  Administrative  Court. Members  have  single  9-year  terms,  with
one-third  replaced  every  three  years. Cases  can  be brought  upon  request  of 1/5
of the  members  of the  Picliament,  the  President,  the  Council  of  Ministers,  the
Supreme  Cassation  Court,  the Supreme  Administrative  Court, 1 9 or the Attorney
General. The  powers  of the  Court  may be changed  only  with an amendmsnt  of the
Constitution. Although  this is a very new institution  for  Bulgaria,  it could
grow--as  it  haA,  for  example,  in  Hungary--to  be a  decisive  check  on  the  power  of
the  executive  and legislative  branches  of government.
Rights  to Real  ProDerty
The reform  of property  rights  is the  most complicated  legal  challenge  in
Bulgaria.  The country  faces  problems  similar  to those in other  Central and
Eastern  European  ("CEE")  countries  emerging  from  socialism. Marxist  attitudes
towards  property,  which shaped  the  entire  economic  system  of every socialist
state,  were  profoundly  different  from  those  of  market  economies.  Reversing  these
attitudes  and  the laws  and institutions  that  embody  them is  a slne  qua  non for
private  sector  development.
Defining  the  Basic  Lezal  Framework
Unlike  other  CEE  countries,  Bulgaria  did  not  have  a comprehensive  unified
Civil Code governing both property and  contract relations among private
individuals  in the decades  prior  to the socialist  period.  Rather,  individual
property  rights  were governed  by the  Property  Act, and  contracts  were governed
by  the  Law  on  Obligations.  Both  were  baeud  loosely  on  German  civil  law,  and  tIus
both  embodied  the  basic  civil  law  concepts  common  to  European  capitalist  systems
of the  period.
After  World  War II,  Bulgaria  moved  quickly  to strict  central  olanninf  ind
is  No institution  had such  power  of judicial  review  before  or during  the
socialist  period.
19  Other  courts  may not rule on the constitutionality  of laws  but should
instead  refer  such  questions  to the  Constitutioral  Cour'..8
control, and--unlike Yugoslavia,  Poleud, or  Hungary--it rt-sx  nd  tightly
centralized  throughout  the socialist  p2riod.  In addition  to adapting  a now
socialist  constitution  (with  extensive  provilBlons  on  property),  the  pre-war  laws
on property  and  obligations  were explicitly  abrogated  in 1951  and replaced  by
socialist  logisletion  in line  with Marxist  doctrine. 20 The 1951  Property  Act
replaced the pro-wor version ir defining property  rights and relations of
individuals.  Although  maintaining  many  civil  law  concepts,  it  also  added  certain
now  principles  and  provisions  to fit  the  needs  of a  socialist  state.
One of the unique  features  of socialist  property  law  was its concept  of
hierarchy  of property  based  on ownership. The two socislist  Constitutions  of
1949 and  1971 defined the three main categories of ownership.  "Social"
ownership--ownership  by all  the  psople  in  theory,  by tha  state  in  practice--was
the  highest  category  of  ownership  and  rece.ved  special  protection.  Such  property
included  virtually all urban industrial  and coumercial  proparty," mineral
resources,  and  public  utilities.  Although  in  theory  regulated  by law,  it  tended
to  be  managed  in  practice  through  decisions  of  the  Council  of  Ministers. Because
this kind of property  was  excluded  from indi7idual  transactions  under the
Constitution,  i' was not  covered  by the  provisions  of the  1951  Property  Act.
The other two forms of property  were "cooperative"  and "individual"
property. Cooperative  property  included  most  agricult  ral  land  and  was  governed
by the law on cooperatives.  "Individual"  real property  was limited  to one
residence  and  one  vacation  house  per  household  (but  not  a  separate  rental  house,
which -,As  considered  a  means  of  production). Individual  property  rights  and
transfers were  governed during the  socialist period by  the  1951 Law  on
Property. 22
Because of  the  superiority  of  social property, the  two  socialist
constitutions provided practically unrestricted rights to  the  State  to
expropriate  individual  property. In urban  areas  these  right  was  widely  used.
All industrial  property  and  much  residential  property  was  nationalized  pursuant
to the  nationalization  laws  of 1947  and 1948,  and small  private  plots of land
were  gradually  expropriated  to  secure  the  land  needed  for  large-scale  residential
20  This  contrasts with Romania,  where the old Civil Code was never
abrogated.
21  Until  1990,  the  socialist  Constitution  did  not  permit  individuals  to  own
commercial  property. The 1990  amendments  removed  this  restriction.
22  During the socialist  period other laws suspended temporarily  the
application  of the  Property  Act to particular  transactions,  types  of property,
or regions  of the country.  One  example  was the residential  property  law--The
Property of  the Citizens Act  (1971)--which  attempted to  limit individual
ownership  and  provide  affordable  housing  to  all  through  administrative  means,  and
in  effect  displaced  the  Property  Act (except  in  small  and  relatively  unpopulated
rural  areas)  for  some  20  years. Widespread  application  of the  Property  Act  was
restored  only  with the 1990  partial  repeal  of the  Property  of the  Citizens  Act.9
and  public  construction  (and  very  often  also  for  th.z.  needs  of  the  Communist  Party
and other  public  organizations).  Although  the state  kept  firm  control  of
coimercial  prcperty,  almost  all  residential  property  nationalized  or  later  built
by  the  state  was  aold  to  tenants  at  low  prices  in  the  1950s  and  1960s.
The Bulgarians  moved  quickly  in 1990  and  1991  to change  the  basic  legal
coucepts  underlying  property  ownership.  'he  hierarchy  of  property  was  eliminated
with the  amendment  of the  old  Constitut;.jn  in 1990  and  the  adoption  of the  rew
Constitution  in 1991. As noted earlier,  the  new Constitution  grants  full  and
equal  protection  to all property  regardless  of ownership,  and it forbids
expropriation  except  for carefully-defined  public  purposes  and  with full and
adequate  compensation. The  Property  Act  was also amended  in  1990  to  eliminate
some  of tha  socialist  overlay  addeel  in 1951. It  now  refers  to private  property
and state property, rather then individual  and social  property.  The law
reflects  the basic  civil  law framework  of its  pro-war  rredecessor  and is thus
generally  adequate  to  govern  property  rights  and  relations  in  the  private  sector.
It  does  not  adequately  address,  however,  the  entire  panoply  of  difficult  problems
relating  to state-owned  property.
8liminatina  the State  Monopolv  on Pro2erty  Ownershil
A major challenge ir,  developing  a merket economy in Bulgaria is to
eliminate  the  virtual  monopoly  of  the  state  over  cormercial  property  that  existed
during  the  socialist  oeriod. This  entails  both  privatizing  commercial  property
(or  "reprivatizing"  it  to  previous  owners)  and  developing  an  active  rental  market
in  property  still  held  by the  state.
Refining  the-1ublic  ower.  Before  state  property  can  be sold  or leased,
one  must first  define  the actual  owner--the  actual  person  or entity  with full
right of use and transfer.  Yet ownership  of social  property  was somewhat
indeterminate  during  the  socialist  period.  Pursuant  to  the  Marxist  doctrine  of
"indivisibility  of  ownership", neither local governments nor  state-owned
enterprises  ("SOEs")  awned the property  they used,  managed,  or transferred;
rather  they  had the ownership-like  right  of "operational  management." State-
owned  enterprises  that ioperationally  managed"  propert,  could  in  some  cases  lease
it but could  never sell it.  The relevant  overseeing  ministries  had ultimate
decision-makirg  authority  with regard  to such property.  Municipalities  had
somewhat  more indendent  authority  than SOEs.  Under the Property  Act, the
chairman  of the local  municipal  council  could  transfer  state-owned  residential
property  within  municipal  boundaries  to individuals 25 (at  prices  fixed  by  the
Council  of Ministers 24).
21  Although  the  Property  Act  did  not  apply  to  property  (including  virtually
lll commercial  property) used or transferred  exclusively  within the public
sphere, it did apply to property transfers  between the state and private
individuals,  as referred  to here.
24  Because  of relatively  low  pri4es,  the  right  to buy  state-owned  land  was
a  highly  sought-after  privilege. A heavy  bureaucracy  existed  to check  whether
the  applicant  was qualified  to  buy the  land,  and  buyers  often  waited  for  years
for  the  transaction  to be concluded.10
Ownership  of SOE  property  became  a major  issue  it  1990  as Bulgaria  began
its  economic  transitzon  in  earnest.  The  1990  amendments  to  the  1970  Constitution
removed  the  prohibition  against  individual-ownership  of  commercial  property,  and
Decree  56 (discussed  in  greater  detail  below)  for  the  first  time  permitted  SOE's
to  enter  into  joint  ventures  with  private  partners. For  a  brief  period  in 1990
and  early  1991,  some  Bulgarian's  thought  that  SOE's  would  be able  on their  own
initiative  to transfer  real  property  to the private  sector,  in particular  to
contribute  real  property  to  a joint  venture. However,  the  Law  on the  Formation
of State  Property  Sole Proprietorship  Companies  of June 27, 1991 essentially
barred  such  transfers  of  property  by  SOEs. The  law  gave  the  Council  of  Ministers
all rights  as sole owner of the SOE (as  defined  under the Commercial  Law),
including  control over  All  real property.  Although this clarification  of
ownership  rights  was an important  first step in managed privatization,25  it
clearly  slowed  down  the  development  of a  private  real  estate  market  (just  as it
slowed  the  privatization  process  more generally).
At present  all parties  accept  the basic principle  that the Council of
Ministers  controls  real  property  attached  to SOEs,  while  municipal  governments
have the power to transfer  other  property  within  municipal  boundaries. This
means,  for  example,  that  private  entrepreneurs  seeking  leases  of  commercial  space
generally know with whom  they must negotiate.  However, there is  still
considerable  uncertainty  about  the  exact  powers  of  municipalities  with respect
to the  property  they  control--including  what  property  they  actually  own  (rather
than  just  administer)  and  who  sets  sale  prices  and  is  entitled  to  sale  proceeds.
These issues  are  now being  debated  and  negotiated  in the  political  arena.
Regrivatizing  urban prooerty.  The issue  of restitution  of previously-
nationalized  property  is the  subject  of intense  debate  in Bulgaria,  as in all
other  CEE  countries.  In  December,  1991,  Parliament  took  a first,  limited  move  by
passing  a law providing  for the restitution  of certain  small  shops  and other
business  premises. Specifically,  under  this  law  former  owners  will be able to
reclaim  all business  premises  bought  by the State at artificially  low prices
pursuant  to  Ordinance  #60  (1975'  of  the  Council  of  Ministers. Because  the  number
of such properties  is relatively  small, this law is not expected  to cause
extensive  uncertainty  and  disruption  in  property  markets.
Restitution  of resieential  property  nationalized  after the  war is more
difficult,  because  most  such  property  was  subsequently  sold  to  new  tenants  in  the
19509  and  1960s. Former  owners  of  residential  property  that  remained  unchanged
and in state  hands  will be able  to claim  restitution  under the  Restitution  of
Nationalized  Real Property  Law, passed  by the  Parliament  on February  5, 1992.
Former  owners  whose  property  was  subsequently  sold  to  private  parties  or  changed
in other  ways are entitled  to alternative  compensation,  to be specified  in a
later  law.
Another restitution  law was also passed on February  5th--the law for
25  The law was in fact intended  to curb the process of "spontaneous
privatization"--pursuant  to  which  SOE  managers  could  sell  SOE  assets  to  private
firms they controlled  at artificially  low prices--and  replace it with mora
managed  "top-down"  privatization.11
"Restitution  of Property  Rights  over  Property  Alienated  Pursuant  to the  Urban
Regulation  Law, the  Planned  Uroan  Construction  Law, the  Urban  Development  Law,
the  State-Owned  Real  Estate  Law,  and  the  Property  Law." Its  purpose  is  to  return
to  former  owners  real  property  that  was  expropriated  for  development  purposec  by
the  state,  provided  that  the  property  (if  a  building)  still  exists  or (if  a  plot
of land)  is suitable  for  single  home  construction.
Restitution  of large,  industrial  properties  is not as big an issue in
Bulgaria as it is in East Germany or Czechoslovakia,  for example,  because
Bulgaria's  economy  was  primarily  agrarian  before  World  War  II. The  intention  of
the  Bulgarians  is  to  treat  those  industrial  properties  that  were  nationalized  the
same  as  urban  property,  in  essence  returning  theta  to  foi-mer  owners  (either  legal
persons,  if  they  still  exist,26  or their  former  partners  or  shareholders).  Such
solution,  however,  makas  little  sense  given  the  enormous  changes  that  are  sure
to have  occurred  in  the  business  over  the  past 40  years.  Some  kind  of  monetary
compensation  would appear  to  be more  reasonable.
Reorivatizing  a2ricultural  land.  Because of its traditionally  heavy
reliance  on  agricultute,  land  was always  considered  the  most important  means  of
production  in  Bulgaria. Land  was  never  extensively  nationalized  as  it  was  in  the
Soviet  Union,  although  large  farms  were confiscated  in 1946-47,  broken  up into
smaller  plots,  and  returned  to  the  peasants. Rather  thtn  set  up state  farms,  the
state pressured  farmers  to contribute  their land to cooperative 27 farms,  and
they  gradually  lost  contact  with the  property. Massive  migration  to  the  cities
resulted  in further  loss  of attachment  to the land.  Though  many former  owners
preserved  their  titles  to land,  the  registration  system  lost  its  importance  and
fell  into disuse.
Former  land  owners  in every  CEE  country  have  been  pressing  the  state  for
restitution  of agricultural  land,  and  Bulgaria  is no exception.  On March 4,
1991,  the  General  Assembly  passad  the  Ownership  and  Use  of  Farm  Land  Act.  The
law seeks  to return  land to those  farmers  (or  their  heirs)  who owned  it just
after  the  post-war  agrarian  reform. Farmers  who  never  owned  land  before  are  also
eligible  to  receive  it. Each  household  is  limited  to  20  hectares  (approximately
50  acres),  or  30  hectares  (approximately  75  acres)  in  certain  areas  of  "intensive
land use.  1 2 8 In an attempt to prevent land speculation,  the law prohibits
26  Former  legal  entities  are  unlikely  to still  exist  except  in  the  case  of
some  religious  and  political  organizations.
27  The Bulgarian  cooperative  movement  had a strong  and well-developed
tradition  even  before  the  war. After  the  war,  however,  collectivization  was  very
oftan  forced,  and  cooperatives  became  increasingly  inefficient--overburdened  by
bureaucracy  and centralization.
28  These  limits  reflect  the limits  applied  in the 1947  agrarian  reform.
"Intensive  land use" is not defined,  but specific areas are likely to be
designated  as  w.'w  done  in the  agrarian  reform  law  (The  Earned  Land  Property  Act
of March  9, 1946). It is  unclear  whether  a  household  can  subsequently  acquire
and  own  more  land  than the  limits  set  in this  law.12
recipients  from transferring  their plots again for three years. 3'  The
restitution  is to be carried  out  by the  National  Land  Board  and  269  local  land
boards. The  period  for  submission  of  claims  is  one  year  from  the  passage  of  the
law,'  although  that  term  would  be extended  to 15  months  under  a draft  amendment
now  being  considered  by  the  National  Assembly. By the  end  of  January  1992,  some
512,000  claims  had  been  submitted  for  the  1.42  million  hectares  of  land  available
for  distribution--an  average of  about  2.8  hectares (or  6.8  acres) per
household.30
Although  they  are  just  beginning,  the  land  boards  are  already  facing  many
problems in implementing  the law.  Proving former ownership can often be
difficult,  particularly  for  former  owners  who  have  lost  old  titles. Because  of
the  mergers of  cooperatives (especially  after  1971)  and  the  neglected
registration  system,  borders  of  rural  property  are  often  unclear. Finally,  some
observers  fear  that  important  vested  interests  in  the  existing  cooperative  system
may  attempt  to block  the  reform. The  Government  has  introduced  amendments  that
would  speed  up  the  restitution  process  and  abolish  limits  on  land  holdings  in  the
future.
There  is  also  concern  for  agricultural  efficiency,  especially  in the  case
of crops  that  cannot  be grown  efficiently  on small  plots.  Rather  than  try to
preserve  large  farming  units,  however,  Bulgarian  policy  makers  are  depending  on
the  voluntary  re-creation  of  cooperatives  in  the  old  Bulgarian  tradition  but  in
a  form  that  is acceptable  to the  new  private  farmere  now emerging.
Revising  the  Regulatory  Framework
Land use.  As in most other  CEE countries, 31 Bulgaria's  static  land  use
planning  and large-panel  construction  methods  resulted  in highly inefficient
pattern  of  urban  land  use. Clusters  of  high-rise  residential  units  tended  to  be
separated  from the  urban  core,  resulting  in high infrastructure  and transport
costs.  In the absence  of market  signals,  the goverment often converted  good
agricultural  land  to  industrial  use  rather  than  utilize  lower-quality  land  within
a  municipality. The  development  of  a private  market  in land  and  buildings  will
slowly  help  to correct  these  inefficiencies  in  land  use,  if accompanied  by  more
dynamic  and  generally  less  restrictive  zoning  rules. The  large  fines  now  applied
on the conversion  of agricultural  land to other  uses should  be phased  out as
market  mechanisms  and  complementary  zoning  regulations  develop.
Registration. The system  for registering  individual  real property  was
never  interrupted  during  the  socialist  period  and  continues  to  work  quite  well.
There  was,  and  still  is,  a  strong  personal  interest  in  recording  all  transactions
dealing  with private  property  (mainly  residential  buildings),  and  the  system--
29  These limits on transfer  may be abolished  by amendments  now being
considered  in  Parliament.
30  Bulgarian  Economic  Review,  Vol. 1,  No. 3, February  11,  1992.
31  See,  for  example,  Polish  Legal  Framework,  Romanian  LeRal  Framework,  and
HunRarian  Legal  Framework,  supra  note 1.13
computerized  in the mid-1980s.-is  relatively  efficient  and accurate  in this
private  sphere.  However,  due  to lack  of  serious  incentive,  transfers  of state-
owned  property  were not  always  recorded. As noted  earlier,  registration  is in
particular  disarray  in rural areas,  where state-controlled  cooperatives  were
often  merged  and  reorganized  during  the  socialist  period. As land  and  buildings
are  privatized,  incentives  should  reem-rge  for  careful  registration  of  ownership
in both  urban  and  rural  areas.
Morteaae  Lendina.  Mortgage  lending  has long  been common  in Bulgaria.  32
Lending  conditions  under  socialism  were not, however,  those likely  to prevail
under  capitalism,  and  the  transition  to a  new  system  will be difficult. During
the  socialist  period,  housing  was  very inexpensive  due to  controlled  prices  and
subsidized interest  rates, and the debt burden of morgages was  therefore
relatively  easy for  families  to bear.  Furthermore,  because  both banks and
employers  were state-owned  companies,  banks could readily garnish  wages to
satisfy  overdue  mortgage  payments  or, as a last resort, could expect to be
subsidized  by  central  authorities  if  nonpayments  cut  into  bank  profits.  Eviction
was possible  but rare, both because of these alternative  avenues for bank
collection  and  because  of the  paternalistic  attitude  of the  state. To evict  an
owner,  a bank would had to follow  long drawn-out  procedures,  and the state
generally  had to find alternative  housing." Homelessness  was not a socially-
acceptable  outcome.
A private  market  economy  has  very different  features  from  that  described
above. Market-determined  housing  costs  are  likely  to be  much higher,  creating
more  of a burden  on  households  and  thus  greater  likelihood  of default. Private
banks  will not be readily  able to garnish  wages (particularly  wages paid by
32  Unlike  some  other  socialist  economies,  Bulgaria  has  long  had  the  concept
of iadividually-owned  units in multi-family  buildings--i.e.  the concept of
condominium  (although  not  with that  specific  name).  (cite]  Defining  the  unit  for
mortgage  purposes  was  therefore  not  a  problem  as  it  could  be,  for  example,  in  the
case  of cooperative  housing.
Cooperatives  were more  common  in  building  contruction  than in ownership.
In the 1950.  Bulgaria  developed  a specific  form of housing  construction-the
Residential  Construction  Cooperatives  (XCK). The idea  of the  cooperatives  was
to engage the efforts of future  owners in the construction  of multi-family
housing  and  to make them  responsible  for  the  final  works,  the  landscaping,  and
the  maintenance.  This  form  was  widely  used,  but  construction  was  hindered  by  the
lack  of  materials,  restrictions  on  the  use  of  hired  labor,  underdeveloped  systems
of contracting,  and  costs  well above  official  calculations  (the  latter  based  on
fixed  state  prices). The cooperatives  were usually  built  on land  expropriated
by  the  State  and  allotted  to  the  cooperative.  The  former  owners  were  compensated
with apartments  in the  new building. The  members  of the  cooperative  acquired
rights  to  the  building,  but  the  land  remained  state-owned.  When  construction  was
completed,  the cooperative  was dissolved  and  the  participants  became  owners  of
individual  apartments.
"  This obligation  to find alternative  housing  also applied  to evicted
renters  pursuant  to the  Law  on Rent.14
private  employers)  to satisfy  debts,  and  thoy  will  not  be  able to  count  on state
bail-outs  on bad  debts.  Foreclosure  on the  property--and  thus the  possibility
of eviction--will  become  a  necessity  if truly  private  mortgage  lending  is to
emerge.  This  will  clearly take a  major change in attitude  as well as a
rethinking  of the 2egal  framework  for  eviction  and  foreclosure.
Rights  to Intellectual  Property
The  protection  of  intellectual  property  in  CEE  economies  is  a  controversial
subject.  While  supporters  argue  that  intellectual  property  protection  helps  spur
domestic  invention  and  creation  and  attract  foreign  investment,  their  opponents
argue  that  intellectual  property  protection  is  essentially  a  one-v-:  street--that
it protects industrialized  countries (where  most inventions  and creations
originate)  at  the  expense  of  countries  who  must  import  most  technology.  The  most
contentious  areas tend to be patents  for pharmaceuticals and copyrights  for
computer  software  and  books.  All  three  products  are  relatively  easily  copied  and
are crucial  for  economic  development.
Despite  the  debate  on intellectual  property  protection,  many economies  in
transition  from  socialism--including  Bulgaria--are  moving  to  adopt  western-style
Intellectual  property  laws.
34 An important  recent  development  in Bulgaria  is
the  signing  of  the  Trade  Agreement  with  the  United  States,  which  obliges  Bulgaria
to enact  the  modern  legislation  with full  protection  of intellectual  property.
Patents
During  the  socialist  period,  patent  law  had little  meaning  in Bulgaria's
domestic  economy. State  control  over  the  economy  was pervasive,  and  inventors
worked  within  the state  apparatus. The  basic framework  for  patent  rights  was
provided  by the  Law  on  Inventions  and  Innovations  of October  18,  1968. This  law
was firmly  based  on socialist  principles  and  was thus  strongly  oriented  towards
the  protection  of the  rights  of the  state. For a large  category  of products,35
inventors--generally  employees  within  state-owned  enterprises--were  given  credit
for  their  inventions  in  the form  of "authorship  certificates,"  which  were one-
time  cash  awards  calculated  gerarally  as a  percentage  of the  "economic  effect",
or savings  achieved  by thi design  or a percentage  of the net return  on the
34  In some  cases  this  is  being  done  under  threat  of retaliatory  practices
from industrialized  countries.
35  All  chemical substances,  all  substances used for  pharmaceutical
purposes, for food and in cosmetics (obtained  by chemical or non-chemical
methods),  all  methods  used for  medical  purposes,  the  new  varieties  of crops  or
new breeds of animals, technical  solutions  to problems  related to nuclear
technologies,  and all inaventions  made as part of the work assignment  by a
"socialist  organization"  or  related  to  the  defence  or  the  security  of the  country
(Article  14).15
invention.'5  These  awards were  typically quite  small, providing little
incentive  for  inventive  behavior. Patents  could  in  principle  be obtained  by  the
socialist  organization  with  whom the inventor  worked,  but  in practice  domestic
patents were,  rare. 37 Patents could also be obtained to protect Bulgarian
inventions  abroad, 38 even if only an "authorship  certificate"  had been issued
in the  country.
Foreigners  have  always  been  able  to  register  patents  in  Bulgaria. In 1923
Bulgaria  signed  the  Paris  Convention  for  the  Protection  of Industrial  Property
(1883), which  is  the  major  international  treaty protecting patents and
trademarks. The two  most important  rights  granted  by the  treaty  are  national
treatment  of foreigners  and right  of priority  in registration. The right  to
national  treatment  obligates  countries  to treat  foreigners  as they  would their
own  nationals  under  their  own  laws.  The  right  of  priority  gives  the  holder  of
a  patent  one  year (six  months  in  the  case  of  tradamarks)  to file  in  other  member
countries  without  losing  priority  rights  over other  potential  claimants  to the
invention.  However, the criteria  for patentability  is still a  question  of
domestic  law.  Thus, the Paris  Convention  would do little  to protect  patents
without  a Bulgarian  law  that  provided  reliable  substantive  patent  rights. The
Convention  does  provide  a  bit  more  substantive  protection  for  trademarks  than  for
patents by  automatically  protecting well-known marks, apparently without
requiring  that the  mark be registered  in  other  member  countries.
This 1968 patent law is still in force today, although  many of its
36  The  enterprise  was  obliged  to  implement  the  invention  and  pay  50  percent
of the remuneration  not latter then two months after the beginning of the
implementation.  The  balance  of the  remuneration  was due  after  one  year  and  was
supposed  to correspond  to the  actual  "economic  effect". Litigation  between  the
enterp?  .se  and the inventor  concerning  the amount of such effect was  not
uncommon.
37  Although  hardly  ever  used  in  practice,  the 1968  law  allowed  the  state's
patent  office  to issue  a compulsory  license  to third  parties  with compensation
if a  patent registered in Bulgaria had been unjustifiably  unutilized or
underutilized  for three  years  following  the  publication  date  of the  patent  or
four  years  from  the  day  of  filing  the  patent  application  (Article  37).The  concept
of  compulsory  licenses  is  well-known  throughout  the  world. The  Paris  Convention,
discussed  below,  allows  for  the  issuance  of  compulsory  licenses  (Art.  5 lit.  A),
and the patent laws of many countries  provide for them.  The policy  behind
compulsory  licensing  is  that  countries  granting  monopoly  rights  in  intellectual
property deserve something in  return, namely, use  of  those  inventions.
Practically  apeaking,  however,  compulsory  licenses  are  often  ineffective  without
the  cooperation  of the  patentee,  due  to  the  necessary  technological  know-how  in
the  possession  of  the  patentee. Furthermore,  in  many  cases  there  may  be  no  third
party interested  in obtaining  a license  to the  patent.
38  Bulgarian  nationals  were able  to obtain  patents  abroad  only  through  the
Institute  for Inventions  and Innovations.  The use of the foreign exchange
acquired from  foreign licencing of  the  patent was  subjected to  further
bureaucratic  regulation  (Article  46).16
provisions  are  no longer  used.  The  existing  framework  clearly  needs  adjustment
to fit  the  needs of a private  market  economy. A new Patent  Law that  provides
patent  protection  more  similar  to  that  in  industrialized  countries  was submitted
to the  National  Assembly  in  early  December. Enforcement  and  dispute  resolution
procedures  must  also  be developed  for  any  new  law  to  have  a  meaningful  effect  in
practice.  There ie  virtually  no experience  with the enforcement  of private
patents,  which  will be the  major  challenge  of Bulgaria's  intellectual  property
regime  as it  moves  to a market  economy.
Trademarks  and  Industrial  Designs
Bulgarian  trademarks  and industrial  designs  are protected  by the  Law on
Trade  Marks  and  Industrial  Designs  from  1967. The law  is  also  one  of the  first
in Central and Eastern Europe to protect appellations  of origin,  which is
important  for  many  Bulgarian  agricultural  products,  especially  the  quality  wines.
Under  the  law,  trademark  protection  lasts  for  10 -ears  and  is  renewable  (Article
19).  The right  of exclusive  use of an industrial  design  lasts  for five  years
(Article  29).  Trademarks  are  protected  upon registration  at the Institute  of
Inventions  and Innovations.  Limited  protection  is also available  for non-
registered  trade  marks  with common  and long standing  usage;  If someone  else
tries  to  register  the  same  or essentially  similar  mark,  the  prior  user  may  apply
for  registration  of  the  mark  within  three  months. The  trademark  law,  in  contrast
to the  patent  law,  does  not  appear  to  need  major  overhaul.
Bulgaria  is  also  signatory  to  the  most  current  text  of  the  Madrid  Agreement
Concerning  the  International  Registration  of  Marks  (Stockholm,  1967).  The  Madrid
Agreement  protects  both trademarks  and service  marks by allowing  members of
signatory  countries  to register  their  trademarks  with the International  Bureau
of the  World  Intellectual  Property  Organization  (WIPO)  in  Geneva. The  mark  must
first  be registerel  in the  country  of origin,  whose administration  applies  for
registration  with WIPO.  The  effect  of  WIPO is that  the  trademark  is protected
in all signatory countries.  Upon notification  of the registration  of a
trademark,  national  administrations  may still  be authorized  by national  law  to
declare  that  certain  trademark  protection  cannot  be granted  in that  territory.
Thus, like the Paris Convention,  the Madrid  Agreement  depends  ultimately  on
domestic  law  in protecting  substantive  rights.
CoPyriaht
The  Copyright  Law  is  one  of the  oldest  Bulgarian  laws  in  force.  It  covers
works of literature,  science  and  art that  are  the  product  of creative  activity
and are published  or expressed  in any form.  Protection  does not depend on
"aesthetic  content" or originality. 39  This wide definition  makes the law
potentially  applicable to certain commercial  products, including computer
software.
Protection  grants  the  owner  the  right  of public  recognition  (Article  3),
the  right  to publish  the  work and  to authorize  the translation  and  publication
39  See  Eric S. Schwartz,  Recent  Developments  in the  Copyright  Retimes  of
the  Soviet  Union  and  Eastern  Europe,  38 J. Copyright  Society  123-133  (1991).17
in  other  languages  (Article  4).  Protection  lasts  for  the  life  of the  author  and
for  fifty  years after  his or her death.  The copyright  passes  to the  heirs  by
law,  or to heirs  designated  by the  will of the author. If there  are  no heirs
left,  the  copyright  passes  to the  State  (Article  18).
On  the  international  front,  Bulgaria  is  a  signatory  to  the  Berne  Convention
(Paris  text  of  1971),  which  protects  literary,  scientific,  and  artistic  works  for
50  yeers. The  convention  traditionally  includes  computer  eoftware,  which  is  the
most controversial  subject of international  copyright protection. 4 0 Under
Berne,  no formalities  are  required  to  protect  a  work in  other  member  countries.
Whereas in the country or origin  protection  may depend on registration,  no
central  registration  exists  for  international  protection:  upon creation,  works
are  protected.
ImDlementation
Enforcement  capacity  is an issue in all of the areas of intellectual
property  law  discussed  above. Although  a  registration  procedure  exists,  can  a
holder  of intellectual  property  rights  actually  protect  these  rights  if  another
person  infringes  them?
The  enforcement  capacity  of  the  existing  Bulgarian  agencies  varies  for  the
different  areas  of intellectual  property.  While  copyright  has  been  successfully
protected for some time, the lack of experience  in dealing  with patent or
trademark  protection  over  the  last  40  years  makes  those  areas  more  problematic.
Trademark  infringements  are growing daily,  but little  action is being taken
despite  the  existence  of the  appropriate  provisions  in  the  Criminal  Code. Very
few  lawyers  specialize  in  protection  of  intellectual  property  outside  of  the  few
state institutions  active predominately  in the  protection of  copyrights.
Enforcement  will emerge  as a  critical  issue  as the  private  sector  and foreign
investment  grow. Giving  true  meaning  to  these  rights  will  require  institutional
strengthening  in the registration  agencies and the courts to insure that
infringements  can  be identified,  halted,  and  punished  as appropriate.
ComDany  Law
Historical  Development
The first  Bulgarian  company  law  was the  Commercial  Law of Hay 29, 1°97.
It  was based  on German  Commercial  Law  but  also  borrowed  from  other  continental
legal  systems. It  was amended  several  times  before  1946,  and  related  laws  were
passed--including  the  Law  on  Limited  Liability  companies  (1929),  the  Law  on the
Cooperatives  (1907),  and  the  Law  on the  Stock  Exchange  (1912  and 192B).
In 1951  all  commercial  laws  in Bulgaria  were abolished  and replaced  by a
legal  system  designed  to  meet the  needs  of  a  centrally  planned  economy. For  the
40  It is worth noting, however, that Berne allows countries to deny
protection  of certain works through  domestic  legislation,  even if they are
covered  by Berne.18
next  four decades,  the activity  of Bulgarian  enterprises  was regulated  through
constantly  changing (and sometimes  contradictory)  decrees  of the Council  of
Ministers. Market-oriented  commercial  law  ceased  to be taught  at the  only law
school  in Bulgaria--the  University  of Sofia.  Only a few Bulgarian  lawyers
maintained  exposure  to  market-oriented  commercial  principles  while  working  for
foreign trade companies or the few companies  with Bulgarian participation
registered  abroad. A few  joint-stock  companies  continued  to  be  formed  by decree
of  the  Council  of  Ministers,  but  in  practice  they  operated  like  other  state-owned
enterprises. Several  companies  with foreign  participJtion  were formed  under
State  Council  decree  535/1980,  but their  activity  was  very limited.
Decree  56 of 1989
The  State  Council's  is&  -e  e  of  Dscree  56 in  January  1989  was a  watershed
event  in  Bulgaria's  transition  to a  market  economy,  even  though  at the  time it
was issued  the  move to  a  market  economy  was not  a clearly-defined  goal. Decree
56 represented  Bulgaria's  first attempt to restructure  and decentralize  the
management  of state  enterprises, as  well as its first  move to allow private
investment  in commercial  activities. Decree  56 re-established  most forms  of
companies  that  existed  in the  prewar  Commercial  Law, including  the  joint  stock
company,  the limited liability  company,  and the "unlimited  liability  firm"
(similar  to a  limited partnership).4 2 State-owned  firms were supposed to
reorganize  into  joint  stock  or limited  liability  companies.  Private  and  foreign
investment could be structured  as of these more  formal entities or more
informally  as  "individual", "collective", or  "partnership" "firms  of
citizens".' 3 The first  version  of the  Decree  restricted  the  rights  of private
companies to participate  in foreign trade or to hire workers, but these
restrictions  were subsequently  removed.
Decree  56 succeeded  in decentralizing  some decision  making  within  state
enterprises  and  in  stimulating  the  beginnings  of  private  entrepreneurship  in  the
44 economy.  However, it had many shortcomings.  First, its philosophy  was
somewhat  schizophrenic,  in  that  it  attempted  to  combine  continuing  state  control
with economic  liberalization  and  private  entrepreneurship. 4S  Second,  it  was  too
41  An earlier,  unsuccessful  attempt  was  made in 1987-88  to transfer  state
enterprise  property  to employees.
42  General  partnerships  could  be formed  under  the  Law on Obligations  and
Conracts.
43  Of these  only the partnership  firm of citizens  was a registered  and
taxable  legal  entity. The  individual  firm  was essentially  a sole  proprietorship
and  the  collective  firm  was essentially  a "pass-through"  general  partnership.
44  It was accompanied  by other reforms to the same end, including  a
reduction  in central  price  controls  and revisions  in tax  and  accounting  rules.
45  Unlike in some other CEE countries,  economic  reform to some degree
preceded  political  reforr  in Bulgaria.  The desire  to maintain  central  power
reflects  the fact  that  the  communist  government  was still  in firm  control  when19
broad  and  thus too  general,  designed  as a comprehensive  business  code  and  thus
covering not  only  company formation and  liquidation  but  also  taxation,
bankruptcy,  foreign  investment,  and  even  currency  regulation  and  social  security.
A document  of 126 Articles  and about.  30 pages  was clearly  too short and too
general to cover these complex areas adequately.  Subsequent  implementing
regulations  issued  by  the  Council  of  Ministers  also  failed  to  clarify  outstanding
issues.
The  Commercial  Law of 1991
The new Bulgarian  Commercial  Law" was the first  post-war  law  drafted  by
a te.am  of Bulgarian  lawyers  in  line  with  prewar  legal  tradition,  and in  general
it  is fully  satisfactory  for  the  needs  of a  market  economy. While  following  in
general  the  pre-war  law,  an attempt  was  made to introduce  post-war  company  law
concepts  from  western  Eu'rope.  These  concepts  aim  primarily  for  flexibility--for
example,  flexibility  in  establishing  managing  bodies,  in  assigning  voting  rights,
and in converting  bonds  into  shares  in  joint-stock  companies. Most provisions
concerning  Articles of Association  are optional  and may be changed by the
partners.  At the same time, care is taken to protect various interests,
especially  small  investors  and  creditors.
The  law  recognizes  the  five  types  of  companies  that  are  common  in  European
civil  law jurisdictions. 4'  The  joint-stock  company  (JSC)  resembles  the  French
S.A., the  German  AG, and the  Anglo-American  public  corporation. The limited
liability  company  (LLC)  is  similar  to  the  French  S.A.R.L  and  the  German  GmBH,  and
to some  extent 48 to the  private  (closed)  corporation  under  Anglo-American  law.
These  two  are  the  investment  vehicles  most  likely  to  be used  by the  majority  of
medium  and  large  investors.  In  addition,  limited  partnerships  (equivalent  to  the
German  'Kommanditengeselschaft"  or  the  French  "societe commandite") or
partnerships  limited by shares ("societe  commandite  par accion" or "KG mit
Actionen")  may be formed for specific  purposes  as described  below.  Small
businesses  may operate  through  general  partnerships. Another  law, the  Law on
Obligations and  Contracts, provides the  traditional form  of  the  civil
partnership,  which has  no legal  personality.
Characteristics  of the Joint-Stock  ComDany.  At least  two founders  are
necessary  to set  up a JSC (or  one  if the  State  is a founder)  (Articles  61,  63,
159).  Capital  requirements  are  high  relative  to those  in  other  CEE countries.
Minimal  capital  of  BGL (Bulgarian  Lev)  1  million  (about  $50,000)  is  required,  or
Decree  56  was passed.
46  State  Gazette  No. 48,  June 18,  1991,  in effect  from  July 1, 1991.
47  The  Trade  Act  regulates all  companies (ApyXeCTBO)  with  "legal
personality." These include  the  general  partnership,  the limited  partnership,
and  the  limited  partnership  with  shares,  which  in  Bulgaria  (unlike  in  some  other
jurisdictions  such  as t}e  U.S.)  are  taxable  legal  entities.
48  The civil law forms do not, however, have the pass-through  tax
advantages  of the  American  Subchapter  S corporation.20
5 million (approximately  $250,000)  if raised  by public offering."9  This  may
include the value of in-kind contributions,  as evaluated  by three experts
appointed  by the Court  upon request  of the founders  and contributors  (Article
72).5°  The esitire  capital  of the  company  must be subscribed,  but  only  251  must
be  contributed  prior  to  the  registration  (Article  174). Capital  can  be  increased
by issuing  now shares,  by appreciation  of the  nominal  value  of shares  already
issued,  by conversion  of convertibie  bonds into shares (Article  192),  or by
partial  capitalization  of profits  upon a  decision  of the general  meeting of
shareholders  (Article  197). Bonds (including  convertible  bonds if so  provided
by  the  Articles  of  Association)  may  be issued,  but  their  value  may  not  exceed  50
percent  of deposited  capital.
Reporting  requirements  are designed  to  promote  transparency  and the  flow
of  information  to  shareholders  and  creditors.  Financial  data  on  the  company  must
be included  in  the  Articles  of  Association  and  made  available  to  the  court  prior
to registration. They must also be entered in the Commercial  Register  and
published  (Article  174).  Raising  capital  through  public  subscription  requires
a detailed  prospectus.
The  law  provides  great  flexibility  in  assigning  shareholders'  rights.  Both
registered  and  bearer  shares  are  allowed  and  may be exchanged  for  one  another.
Shares  are  transferable,  but the  articles  of association  may impose  conditions
on the  transfer  of registered  shares  besides  the  entry  into  the share  register
(Article  185). Shareholders  are  entitled  to  dividends  and  liquidation  proceeds
in proportion  to their  capital  contributions.  Interest  bear'ng  shares  are  not
allowed.  A share entitles  the shareholder  to one vote in the appropriate
meetings  (Article  181),  although  shares  with  special  voting  rights  can  be issued
if  so provided  by the  Articles  of Association. Preferred  shares  entitled  to  a
guaranteed  or additional  dividends  or liquidation  proceed are also allowed
(Article  182). The  Articles  of  Association  may  provide  that  such  shares  will  be
non-voting." 1 Shares  with equal  rights  form  a  separate  class,  and  restrictions
of the  rights  of  such  class  may only  be taken  with the  consent  of  the  meeting  of
this class  of shareholders  (with  at least  50 percent  of the shares  represented
and at least  three-fourths  consent  of those  represented).
The system  of corporate  governance  is similarly  very flexible,  allowing
either  one-tier  (Board  of Directors  only)  or two-tier  (Board  of Directors  and
49  For banking and insurance  companies  the minimal capital is BGL 10
million.
so  A subscriber  who  does  not accept  the  evaluation  is free  to contribute
in cash or withdraw  from the  company. Although  this procedure  is designed  to
protect  outside  creditors  from overvaluation  of in-kind  contributions,  it is
somewhat  cumbersome  and  does restrict  the  negotiating  freedom  of the investing
parties.
'"  If  a dividend  is  not  paid to  them  for  two  consecutive  years,  non-votin&
shares  acquire  the  right  to  vote  until  the  dividend  is  paid (Article  182  para  3).21
Supervisory  Board)  systems.5 The former  is likely  to be more appropriate  for
companies  with fever  shareholders  who  can  readily  oversee  management,  while  the
latter  may  be  preferable  for  companies  with  a  larger  number  of  shareholders.  In
the-latter  case  the  supervisory  board  in  supposed  to  provide  an  additional  check
on management  without  being  involved  directly  in  management  decisions.
Characteristics  of a Limited  Liabilitv  ComDanv.  The limited  liability
company  is  an intermediate  form,  designed  to  avoid  the  cumbersome  procedures  and
public  disclosure  requirements  of  a joint-stock  company  and  the  unlimited  joint
and several liability of the partners in a  general partnership.  It was
introduced  for  the  first  time  in  Bulgaria  in  1924  and  was  popular  among  small  and
medium-sized  companies  during  the  prewar  period  because  it  provided  flexibility
while  reinforcing  strong  personal  contacts  between  the  partners. The  number  of
limited  liability  companies  already  formed  under  the  new  Commercial  Law  suggests
that  it  will  again  be  a  very  popular  comparvy  form.
The  limited  liability  company  can  be  formed  by  one  or  more  persons  (Article
113).  There is no maximum number of partners  as in some other countries.
Minimum  capital  of BGL 50,000 (about  US$2,500)  is required.  Rules are very
flexible. The  partners  are  free  to  negotiate  the  distribution  of  voting  rights
and  profits,  the  quorum  needed  for  the general  meeting,  ani the  majority  vote
required  for  particular  decisions. The  share  of the  partner  in the  company  is
proportional  to  his  contribution,  but  this  provision  can  also  be  changed  (Article
127).  At the moment  of registration  only 70 percent  of the capital  must be
effectively  contributed,  with some  partners  contributing  as little  as one-third
(Article  119). While  not  reducing  the  liability  of  partners  in  the  longer-run,
this  flexibility  can  relieve  financial  pressure  in  the  short  term. The  articles
of association  can then establish  under  what conditions  the capital of the
company  will be called  up (Article  115  para 4).
Shares  are  freely  transferable  among  partners.  However,  transfers  to  third
persons  are  conditional  on approval  at  the  general  meeting. Such  limitation  on
outside  transfer,  designed  to  preserve  strong  personal  links  among  the  partners,
is  one  of  the  basic  features  of  the  European  LLC. The  number  of  the  partners  in
the  company  is  not limited.
Characteristics  of the four  gartnershig  forms.  Four  partnership  forms
currently exist under Bulgarian law--the  general partnership,  the limited
partnership, the  limited partnership  divided by  shares, and  the  "civil"
partnership.5 The  first  three  are  governed  by the  Commerclal  Law and  the  last
by the  Law  on Obligations  and  Contracts. Two  major  differences  among  the  four
forms  concern  taxation  and  liability.  The  three  forms  governed  by  the  Commercial
5  In  the  former  the  general  meeting  of shareholders  elects  the  directors,
while  in  the  latter  the  general  meeting  elects  the  supervisors,  who  in  turn  elect
the directors. One person  cannot  be both a  director  and  a supervisor.
53  Although  widely used in Bulgaria, the term "civil partnership"  is
imprecise,  because  there  entities  can  also  engage  in commercial  activity.22
Law  are  considered  taxable  legal  entities,  while  the  c*ivil  partnership  is  not. 5'
With respect  to liability,  all  partners  in  the  general  and  civil  partnerships--
but only the general  partners  in the limited  liability  forms--have  unlimited
joint  and several  liability. The liability  of the  rest of the  partners  in the
limited  forms  is  limited  to  the  amount  of  their  agreed  contribution  (Article  99).
The limited  partnership  divided  by shares,  like the joint-stock  company,  can
raise  capital  through.  public  offerings  and  is subject  to the  same requirements
in so doing.
Procedures  for  Establishing  a Company
Establishing a company in relatively  easy in Bulgaria from a  legal
perspective. Prior to registration,  the founders  of a company  must draft  the
Articles  of  Association,  the  first  general  meeting  of  shareholders  must  approve
the Articles, the management must be appointed, and  the minimal capital
contribution  must  be  made. The  Articles  of  a  JSC  or  LLC  need  not  be  approved  by
a  notary AS  in many other European  countries,"5  although  partnership  deeds
require  notarial  approval.  The founders  then apply to the relevant  district
court for approval  of the Articles and for registration  in the Commercial
Regis,ar. The  company  is  deemed  incorporated  as  of  the  day  it is  entered  in  the
Register.  Upon approval  by the court,  the decision  must be published  in the
Official  Gazette  and  the  company  must register  with the  tax authorities.
The process  is complicated  not by the provisions  of the law,  which are
simple  and  relatively  inexpensive,  but  by the  lack  of  experience  and  capacity  in
the courts of registration  to handle the growing number of applications.
Technical  assistance  and  improved  automation  could  help improve  the  efficiency
and  speed  up the  registration  process. 16
Foreign  Investment
On January  16,  1992,  the  National  Assembly  passed  a  new  foreign  investment
law--the  Law  on the  Business  Activity  of Foreign  Persons  and the  Protection  of
Foreign  Investment.  The  new  Government,  formed  after  the  elections  in  October,
had declared that removing  obstacles  to foreign investment  would be a top
legislative  priority. 5"  TFe new law is extremely  liberal,  imposing  almost  no
constraints  and  offering  generous  incentives  for  foreign  investment.
56  While not very flexible,  the civil  partnership  is sometimes  used by
foreign  investors  because  of its  favorable  tax  consequences.
55  See,  for  example,  Polish  Legal  Framework  and  Romanian  Legal  Framework,
supra  note 1.
56  Romania,  for  example,  has established  an automated  system  for  company
registration.
"  The  new  law  replaced  the  previous  foreign  investment  law,  which  had  only
been in force  for  6  months. The  old  law  was quite  restrictive  in  comparison  to
similar  laws  in  other  CEE  countries.23
Forms  of Investment
Unlike its predecessor,  the applicability  of the new law is reasonably
clesr. Non-residents,  excluding  Bulgarian  nationals,  are  considered  foreigners
for purposes of the  law.  Resident foreign nationals are not considered
foreigners  and  have  unconditional  national  treatment. Bulgarian  nationals  with
a second  dual nationality  who  are resident  abroad  may choose  how to be treated
for  purposes  of the  law  (Article  2,  para  2). Foreign-owned  companies  set  up  and
registered  in Bulgaria are Bulgarian  legal persons and are not considered
foreigners.
Forms  of investment  are  governed  by domestic  law. Foreign  investment  can
be organized  in  any  of the  forms  recognized  in  the  Commercial  Law (as  discussed
above)  or  as  a civil  portnership  under  the  Law  on  Obligations  and  Contracts. In
addition,  foreign  persor.s  and partnerships  -without  legal  personality  can be
recognized  in  Bulgaria  for  purposes  of  the  Commercial  Law  if  registered  in  their
country  of  residence  (Article  3,  para  6). The  share  of foreign  ownership  is  not
limited. Foreigners  can  participate  in joint  ventures  with Bulgarian  entities
or  can  operate  through  wholly-owned  entities. Foreign  companie3  can  also  set  up
branches  in Bulgaria.
No investment  approval  is needed  except in a few areas (as  specified  in a
negative list).5 8 The abolition of the complicated  and trnelear  approval
procedures  of the former  law  is one of the  most important  features  of the  new
one.
Rights  and  Guarantees
Foreigners  receive  national  treatment  in all  areas  except  land  ownership. No
foreigner  may own land (Article  5, para 2), and  no domestic  company  with more
than  50Z  foreign  participation  may  own  arable  land. Foreigners  may,  however,  own
buildings  and  acquire  rights  (including  long-term  leases)  over  land  if  needed  for
business  activity."  Foreigners may  own  residential property with  a
"construction  right"  on the  underlying  land.""
58  Article  5 (Restrictions).  Most of the  areas  on the  negative  list  are
"sensitive" industries for vhich  licenses are  also required of  domestic
investors.  These include  the  manufacture  and trade of arms, ammunition  and
military  equipment;  banking  and insurance,  including  the  acquisition  of shares
in  banking  or insurance  companies;  and  exploration  and  exploitation  of natural
resources in the territorial  sea, the continental  shelf, or the exclusive
economic  zone.
59  Foreign  persons  or foreign-controlled  companies  may not acquire  real
property in some regions of the country,  as designated  by the Council of
Ministers  (Article  5, para  3).
60  Such "construction  right"  is  typically  granted  to owners  of apartments
in buildings  built  on state-owned  land.  It provides  that such  land cannot  be
expropriated  without  regard  to the  building  on it.24
The law guarantees  full  repatriation  of profits (in  domestic  or foreign
currency), foreign debt  service payments, and  other proceeds  (including
liquidation  or sale  proceeds)  from  the  investment  (Article  13).
In line  with Constitutional  guarantees,  the  law  allows  expropriation  only
for important  public  needs that cannot  otherwise  be met (Article  10).  Any
expropriation  must  be  authorized  by  the Minister of  Finance, and prior
compensation  is required,  either  in-kind  or (upon  the  consent  of the  foreigner)
in  money (Article  10,  para 7). Expropriation  decisions  can  be contested  in  the
Supreme  Court.
Tax  Incentives
Tax  incentives  are  covered  not  by  the  foreign  investment  law  but  by  Decree
56.61 This decree  provides,  among other things, five-year  tax holidays  for
companies  with  foreign  participation  that  operate  in  nigh-technology  industries,
agriculture,  food-processing  and tourism,  as well as companies  with foreign
participation  operating  in free-trade  zones.62  Because  the government  has  not
provided  a  specific  list  of "high-tech"  sectors,  the  incentives  are  in  practice
available  to most if not all investors.  The same tax incentives  are not,
however,  available  to  domestic  investors,  even  if  they  operated  in  the  same  kind
of business.  Custom  regulations  provide  for exemption  from custom  duties  of
imports  to be used for export-targeted  production  as well as  relatively  low
duties on imports to be used for  investment.  In general these customs
regulations  apply  equally  to foreign  and  domestic  investors.
Discrimination  against  domestic  investment  is  only  one  of  the  problems  with
tax  incentives for  foreign investment in Bulgaria and  elsewhere. 6'  Tax
incentives--holidays,  in  particular--can  cause  tremendous  revenue  loss  and  can
wreak  havoc  in tax  administration.  Foreign  firms  know countless  ways to shift
income  into and expenses  out of the tax holiday  period, thereby  effectively
stretching  out  the  tax  holiday  period  and  the  corresponding  revenue  loss,  often
for  many  years. Because  tax  authorities  tend  to  ignore  firms  in  holiday  periods,
they do not build up the records  and firm history  needed  to tax these firms
effectively  when the  holidays  expire. And with all of these  costs it is not
clear  that  holidays  do  much on the  margin  to  attract  foreign  investment.  Firms
look  most for stability  and  potential  markets.  Above all, they  want to avoid
major losses,  and holidays  do nothing  to further  than  goal;  firms  that succeed
in  making  profits  are  often  not  so  adverse  to  paying  moderate  taxes  (particularly
if  they  are  from  countries  with foreign  tax  credit  systems  that  would  otherwise
tax them at home,  albeit  perhaps  with some  deferral).  Of course,  firms  will
take  anything  that is offered. Bulgaria  can  hardly  afford  significant  revenue
61  Decree 56 will continue  to govern  taxation  until new tax laws are
introduced,  perhaps  later  in 1992.
62  The  companies  operating  in free  trade  zones  were to be subject  to a 20
percent  rate  of tax  after  the  expiry  of the  holiday  period.
63  Most CEE countries  offer similar  tax  holidays  and other incentives  to
foreign  investors.25
give-aways  at this important  period  in its stabilization  efforts,  nor can it
afford  to complicate  the already  daunting  task of developing  a competent  and
modern  tax administration.  It should  open its doors  to foreign  investors  but
provide  no  better  or  no  worse  than  national  treatment--including  a  moderate  level
of taxation.
Contract  L
Features  of Socialist  Contract  Law
Three  major  characteristics  distinguished  Bulgarian  contract  law  from  its
pre-war predecessor.  First, contracts  among private parties were treated
differently  than  contracts  among  state  enterprises.  The  Bulgarian  contract  law
applicable  to the limited (generally  non-comercial) sphere  open to private
sector  transactions  was the  Las  on Obligations  and Contracts  of 1950. The law
in  theory  applied  to  socialized  enterprises,  but  in  practice  contracts  among  such
enterprises  tended  to be governed  by separate  legislation  or by administrative
orders  and decrees  of  the Council  of Ministers.  Although  the law contained
extensive socialist phraseology  and certain uniquely socialist principles
(especially  with regard  to the priority  of the  plan, as described  below),  it
reflected  many legal  principles  common  to continental  European  legal  systems.
Second,  the  idea  of contractual  freedom  (though  proclaimed  in  theory)  was
in  practice  subordinated  to the  needs  of the  central  plan. The  plan  was  adopted
annually  and  had  the  force  of law. Every  other  related  law  was drafted  in such
way that  the  priority  of the  plan  over individual  contracts  was assured. There
was even  a specific  category  of "pre-contractual"  disputes  in  which  the  subject
matter  was  not the  fulfillment  or  breach  of contract  but  the  very  willingness  of
one  of  the  parties  to  conclude  the  contract. Virtually  the  only  way for  a party
not to conclude  such a contract  was to prove  that the production  capacity  to
fulfill  it  was not  available. Though  no longer  used  in  practice,  such  category
of disputes  is still  reflected  in the  Law  on Obligations  and  Contracts.
Third, socialist  ideology  dominated  contract  law.  Contracts  that  were
consistent  with the  law  but  considered  inconsistent  with the  "rules  of  socialist
co-existence"  could  be nullified.
The  Current  Situation
Although the central planning  agency  was closed and central planning
abolished  in 1990,  no  changes  were  made in  the  Law  on  Obligations  and  Contracts,
which is now the  only functioning  contract  law  in the  country.  The law  still
formally  distinguishes  between  contracts  among  individuals  and  contracts  among
socialized  enterprises,  but  all  current  transactions  are  regulated  by  the  general
provisions  applicable  for  indiviAuals.
As noted  earlier,  this  law  reflects  generally-accepted  civil  law  concepts
of contract  and thus  provides  an acceptable  legal  frawework. It covers  quite  a
wide  breadth  of  topics,  including  security  interests  (Section  VII-Guarantees)  and
negotiable  instruments  (Section  XVIII-Promissory  Notes,  Bills  of Exchange  and
Checks).  However,  some important  commercial  concerns--such  as securities  and
bankruptcy--that  were covered  in  the  pre-war  Commercial  Law  were omitted  during26
the  1951  drafting  of the  Law  on  Obligations  and  Contracts  because  they  were not
longer  considered  relevant  in a socialist  economy.
Currently the aim of Bulgarian lawmakers is to restore the pre-war
Ccmercial  Law in full (adding  a second  book to the new Commercial  Law to
accompany  the first  book on companies)  and thus create  a comprehensive  legal
framework  regulating  commercial  activity.  Only  private  non-business  transeactions
will then be covered  by the  existing  Law on Obligations  and Contracts. Most
commercially-oriented  sections  of the Law on Obligations  and Contracts  will
probably  be transferred  again  (with  some  updating)  to the  Commercial  Law.  Some
types  of  transactions  that  were  introduced  in  Continental  law  after  World  War  II,
such as leasing  and franchising,  will be added.  Though  complex,  the task of
redrafting  and  restructuring  the  law  is likely  to be accomplished  quickly. It
will take  more  time  to  build  experience  with  the  law,  enforcement  capability  and
a body of judicial  interpretation  in the  courts,  and the  strict  discipline  for
contract  fulfillment  in the  population.
Bankruotcv
Historical  Background
A working  bankruptcy  system  not  only  provides  a  critical  "exit"  mechanism
in  a  market  economy,  but it  is  needed  also--along  with good  collateral  and  debt
collection  mechanisms  more generally--to  discipline  borrowers  and  spur  the  flow
of  credit  to  newly-emerging  private sector  in  Bulgaria and  other  CEE
countries."  Bulgaria had a well-developed  legal framework for bankruptcy
before  World  War II.  It  was incorporated  in  the  Commercial  Law  and  was  modeled
after  the  French,  Italian  and  Romanian  Commercial  Codes,  but  with some  original
provisions.  After being adopted in 1897, the bankruptcy section of the
Commercial  Law  was amended  several  times,  the  last  time in 1934.  Considerable
practice  and  a  body  of  court  practice  was built  before  the  bankruptcy  provisions
were abolished  with the  rest  of the  Commercial  Law in 1951.
These  prewar  bankruptcy  regulations,  though  comprehensive,  suffered  from
the  same  problems  of  other  Europ.an  systems--long  and  expensive  court  procedures,
low recovery  rate,  and the availability  of loopholes  through  which the  debtor
could  transfer  property  before  initiation  of the proceedings. Bankruptcy  was
harsh  and  meant certain  closure  of the debtor  firm;  reorganization  was not an
option  in  these  prewar systems.  A  Law  on  Mutual Agreement Procedure
("Concordat")  was, however,  passed  in 1932  to provide  an alternative  path for
insolvent  debtors--a  framework  to  negotiate  proportional  debt  reduction  with  all
creditors  and thus  continue  in  operation. Similar  laws  were  passed  in  most  CEE
countries  during  the  prewar  period.
64  Bankruptcy  is  a rather  blunt  tool that  works  best "on  the  margin"  in a
generally  healthy  economy. It is  not  necessarily  a  good  tool  to  handle  the  many
large  loss-making  state  firms  left  over from  the socialist  period,  which need
instead to be handled together  in a coordinated  program of privatization,
restructuring,  and liquidation.27
Bankruptcv  Procedures  under  Decree  56
Bankruptcy  as  a  concept  was  incompatible  with  a  centrally  planned  ezonomy.
The  State,  as  the  sole  owner  of  all  commercial  assets,  supported  both  debtors  and
creditors  and was ultimately  responsible  for the relationships  between them.
With  all  input,  output,  and  prices  set  by the  plan,  enterprise  "failure"  was  not
necessarily  a cause for closure  but rather  a cause for restructuring  of the
enterprise  or the  plan  or  both. Indeed,  a  goal  of  the  system  was  not  to  promote
competition  but to terminate  it altogether.  Bankruptcy  as a  concept  was
forgotten;  if mentioned  at all, it was as a negative  feature  of free-market
economies.
Along  with its  many other  tasks  in connection  with the transition  to a
market economy,  Decree 56 of 1989 attempted  to reintroduce  the concept of
bankruptcy.  Although still the relevant  law in this field, the bankruptcy
framework  provided  by  Decree  56  is  ill-equiped  for  the  needs  of  a  market  economy.
It  reflects  the  extensive  involvement  of  the  state  in  enterprise  decision  making
that  existed  in 1989  when the  Decree  was adopted. It also  reflects  a desire  to
keep  insolvent  enterprises  afloat  if  possible.  Not  only  does  it  anticipate  state
assistance  to rescue  insolvent  enterprises  (without  setting  precise  guidelines
for  such  assistance),  but  it  erects  barriers  to  creditor  initiation  of  bankruptcy
procedures. First,  60  days  of  nonpayment  is  required  before  a  firm  is eligible
for bankruptcy.  Second,  before  bankruptcy  can be initiated,  creditors  must
negotiate  with the debtor  to try to reach  conciliation. Although  supposedly
limited  to one  month,  such  negotiations  can  be extended. Third,  even if such
negotations  fail  and  bankruptcy  begins,  the  court  cannot  appoint  a  liquidator  and
take  actions  to  stop  the  firm's  transactions  until  the  debtor  produces  a  detailed
list  of its assets  and liabilities. These  preliminary  steps  can in practice
delay  bankruptcy  indefinitely,  thereby  risking  even further  loss  of assets  and
unnecessarily  burdening  creditors  (particularly  in such a highly  inflationary
environment).
Once  bankruptcy  begins,  a liquidator  is appointed  to collect  the  list  of
cla-= and  liquidate  assets  to  satisfy  such  claims  to  the  extent  possible.  Claims
are  to be satisfied  in the  following  order:  wages,  tort  liabilities,  claims  of
the  state,  claims  secured  by lien  or mortgage,  and unsecured  claims. A major
barrier  to the satisfaction  of claims,  however,  is the  extensive  limits  placed
on the  sale  of certain  categories  of assets--most  notably  real  estate--used  by
state  enterprises  but owned  by the  state.
The  bankruptcy  procedures  under  Decree  56 have only  rarely  been  applied.
Not  only  are  they  slow  and  cumbersome,  but  there  is  still  little  incentive  to  use
them. A  well-functioning  bankruptcy  systems  requires  a  true  conflict  of  interest
between  debtors  and  creditors,  and  this  still  does  not  exist  in  the  state-owned
sector. Indeed,  it is unlikely  ever  to exist  as long  as the  bulk of creditors
and debtors  are owned by the state.  For that reason,  it can be argued  that
bankruptcy  as known in advanced  market  economies  will only take firm root in
transforming  socialist  economies  when the  private  sector  has  grown  sufficiently
to allow  an extensive  network  of links  to develop  between  private  debtors  and
private  creditors  (whether  banks  or suppliers).28
The  New  Draft  Bankruptcv  Law
Recognizing  the shortcomings  of Decree 56, the Bulgarians  are in the
process  of  prbparing  a  new  bankruptcy  law. The  new  draft  law  closely  follows  the
bankruptcy  provisions  in the original  1897  Commercial  Law.  Although  a  major
improvement  over Decree 56, the draft law does not reflect some important
developments  that have occurred in bankruptcy  thinking and legislation  in
industrialized  countries  over the  past 40  years.
First,  the  law  does  not allow  for  reorganization  but  only  for  liquidation
of  a  bankrupt  firm. Liquidation  can  be avoided  only  if  the  debtor  and  creditors
can negotiate  a work-out agreement"5  through  which debts are reduced."  In
contrast,  bankruptcy  legislation  in  both  the  U.S.  and  Europe  has  moved  in  recent
years  in the  direction  of reorganization  over  liquidation.6 7 Chapter  11  of the
1978  U.S. law, for example,  gives  businesses  a chance  to reorganize,  and the
reorganization  can  be  converted  to  liquidation  only  if creditors  establish  clear
cause. Given  the  severe  disruption  likely  to  result  if  all  inefficient  Bulgarian
firms  are  forced  to  liquidate,  Bulgaria  could  well  benefit  from  a  softer  approach
whereby  attempts  are  made to  reorganize  a firm  before  resorting  to liquidation.
Of  course  the  key  is  to  strike  the  right--often delicate--balance.
Reorganization  should  not  become  a  means  to fo'restall  indefinitely  the  winding
up  of clearly  unviable  enterprises.  Many  observers,  for  example,  criticize  the
U.S. approach  as too  lax,  claiming  that  it  gives  existing  and  often  ineffective
managers  too  much  leeway  to  avoid  liquidation  and  thus  keep  inefficient  firms  in
operation,  and it  ties  up too  many  legal  resources  in  lengthy  court  procedures.
In  practice,  the  great  bulk  of reorganization  cases  in  the  U.S.--especially  for
small  and  medium-sized  firms--end  eventually  in liquidation  anyway.
Second,  the  draft  law  reinforces  the  negative  stigma  traditionally  attached
to  bankrupt  firms. Not  only  does  bankruptcy  (even  if  caused  through  negligence)
appear  to be considered  a crime,  but  conclusion  of a bankruptcy  case does  not
appear  to rid  the  debtor  of  potential  claims. Creditors  can  continue  to  pursue
debt collection  even after the debtor's  assets  haye been liquidated,  unless
creditors  and debtors have agreed  to a work-out under the mutual agreement
procedure. This harsh treatment  again  contrasts  with more recent  thinking  in
many  industrialized  countries,  where  bankruptcy  laws  try  to  remove  the  stigma  of
65  Pre-bankruptcy  work-out agreements  are governed  by a companion  law
similar to the prewar model, while work-out agreements in the course of
bankruptcy  are  governed  by Chapter  XI of the  bankruptcy  law.
"6 The  requirements  for  a  post-bankruptcy  work-out  agreement  are  themselves
qu4te strict, and thus are likely  to discourage  debtors and creditors  from
pursuing  this  option. In particular,  all  creditors  must agree  if the  debtor  is
to satisfy  less  than  40 percent  of outstanding  claims. In practice,  unsecured
creditors  rarely  recover  close to 40 percent in bankruptcy  cases around  the
world.
67  Most  major  industrialized  countries  now  have legal  frameworks  for  both
reorganization  and  liquidation,  whether  contained  in  one  law  (as  in  the  U.S.)  or
in two (as  in the  U.K.  and Japan).29
bankruptcy  (assuming  no criminal  intent). Modern  laws  implicity  recognize  that
the very essence  of capitalism  is risk-taking. Some  ventures  are certain  to
fail,  and  the  economy  gains  if those  who lose  through  risk  taking  are  allowed  a
"fresh  start"  free from  past burdens  and  stigma.
Finally,  the draft gives a central role in administering  a bankruptcy
proceeding  to the judge.68 Given the shortage  of capacity  in the Bulgarian
court  system  and the  burgeoning  number  of cases  likely  to arise  in the  future,
the  Bulgarians  should  be careful  to  conserve  scarce  judicial  resources. In  this
regard  more  of the  burden  of  administration  could  fall  to the  trustee,  and  more
decisions  could  be made  without  requiring  meetings  and  approvals.
Related  Issues
Bankruptcy  is only  one part of the larger  framework  for debt  collection
that makes  private  credit  feasible  in a market  economy.  Other  parts of that
framework  will also have to be addressed  if Bulgaria  is to develop  a well-
functioning  credit  system.  For example,  the system  for registering  security
interests  should  be updated  and  broadened  to  include  all  types  of  property  under
all forms of ownership.  (At  present  only mortgages  on privately-owned  real
property  are  reliably  registered.) Second,  the  right  to pledge  or sell  state-
owned assets  must be clarified,  a challenge  intertwined  with the difficult
questions  of property  ownership  addressed  earlier. As in other  CEE countries,
institutions to  implement debt foreclosure  in general and bankruptcy in
particular  must be developed. Training  and  expanding  the  number  of bankruptc.y
judges  and receivers  should  receive  high priority. Important  cases  involving
bankruptcies  should  be published,  as  was  done  before  the  war, to  establish  a set
of precedents  to guide the activities  of debtors, creditors, and judges.
Finally,  credit-rating  services,  which  do  not  yet  exist  in  Bulgaria,  need  to  be
established.
ComRetition  Law
Because  it  was one  of the  most centrally-controlled  economies  during  the
socialist  period,  Bulgaria  started  its  reform  process  with  a  highly  concentrated
industrial  structure. To lower  the  transaction  costs  involved  in implementing
a central  plan, the socialist  government  explicitl.y  created  large  state-owned
monopolies  that dominated  both production  and distribution  of virtually  all
goods. During  the  socialist  period  the  Bulgarian  private  sector  was very  small
and  operated  primarily  in retail  trade  and  some  services.
The structure  and dominance  of the public sector  throught  Central and
Eastern  Europe  is  now  proving  to  be an  obstacle  not  only  for  the  development  of
the  private  sector,  but  also  for  the  improvement  of  the  performance  of  the  public
sector  itself.  Large  state-owned  monopolies  are  able  to  impose  unfair  conditions
on  private  firms,  smaller  public  firms,  and  consumers.  In  essence,  private  firms
68  For example,  the judge  is in charge  of attaching  the property  of the
estate, investigating  questions  concerning  the bankrupt  or its property,  and
overseeing  the sale  of the  debtor's  property.30
are  free  to  thrive  only  in  niches  not  dominated  by the  state  sector. Because  of
their  power  over  output  and  jobs,  large  state  firms  act  as a  powerful  lobby  to
influence  government  decision  making  in  fincal,  monetary,  trade,  and  other  areas.
For-this  reason  the  breakup  and  privatization  of state  monopolies  is essential
not  only  to  the  growth  of  a  private  sector  but  more  generally  to the  development
of a stable  market economy.  Competition  law can be an important tool to
encourage  such  breakup  and  to prevent  abusive  monopolistic  behavior.
On  May  2, 1991,  the  National  Assembly  passed  the  Law  for  the  Protection  of
Competition. The law regulates  both monopolies  and unfair  competition. It
establishes broad  principles concerning illegal behavior and  sets up  a
specialized  office--the  Commission  for the  Protection of Competition' 9--to
prosecute  cases,  with the  possibility  of appeal  to the  Sofia  City  Court.
In  addition,  the  law  allows  individuals,  companies,  the  Competition  Commission,
or the District  Attorney  to bring claims  under the law directly  to district
courts. 7
D  Although  the law is quite  imprecise  and unclear  in its  wording, it
is a useful  start  in this  very difficult  area  of law.
Regulation  of MonoDolies
The  antimonopoly  section  of  the  law  applies  exclusively  to  entities  deemed
to hold  a monopoly  position  either  they  have have  the  exclusive  legal  right  to
carry  on a particular  business  (for  example,  the  existing  tobacco  monopoly)  or
because  they account for  market  share  of over 35 percent (Article  3).*  The
creation  of  monopoly  by  government  (Article  4)  or through  merger  (Article  5) is
not  forbidden  per  se  but  only  if  it  "restricts  free  competition  and/or  pricing."
On the other  hand (and  perhaps  in contradiction  to Article  5), Article  8  bans
cartel agreements  that would establish  explicitly  or implicitly  a domestic
monopoly.
69  The Commission  for  Protection  of Competition  is independent  from the
Government.  Its 10 members (including  the Chairman  and Vice-Chairman)  are
elected  by the  National  Assembly  (Article  2).
70  This joint  jurisdiction  of both the Commission  and the  regular  courts
in competition  cases is unusual.  Although  the same model is followed  in the
U.S.,  in  many  countries  a specialized  agency  has  exclusive  primary  jurisdiction,
with  courts  handling  only  appeals.  Although  providing  two  avenues  of  redress  may
promote more vigorous enforcement  of  the  law, it also  opens up  greater
possibility  of conflicting  interpretations  or misapplication  of the law--a
particular  problem  given  the  complexity  of the  topic.
71  Setting  a  minimum  size  level  (as  a share  of the  entire  domestic  market)
that  will trigger  action  under  the  law  helps  to  save  on  administrative  resources
by targeting administrative  action on those firms most likely to restrain
competition.  However, the threshold of  35  percent, like any  figure, is
arbitrary,  and may or may not reflect  a dominant  position in any particular
market. Much  depends  on  the  definition  of the  product  (and  to  what extent  close
substitutes  exist)  and  the  reach  of  the  actual  market  (including  its  openness  to
international  competition).31
Once  a  monopoly  exists,  it  is  forbidden  from  misusing  its  position,  and  the
definition  of misuse is extremely  broad.  Article 7 defines  as misuses (a)
restricting  the growth  of a  market  or access  thereto;  (b)  applying  inequitable
staiidards  or contract  terms  on others,  or selling  goods  and services  that  are
below  common quality  standards;  (d)  conditioning  a contract  cn  the  acceptance  by
the other party of unrelated  terms ("tie-ins");  (e) "resorting  to economic
constraint  to  cause  other  firms  to dissolve,  split  up,  merge  or transform";  and
(f)  monopoly  pricing  above  cost  for a considerable  period  of time.  Article  8
bans  market-sharing  agreements  among  competitors  if  they  restrict  competition  or
harm  consumers,  and  Article  10  prohibits  contracts  granting  exclusive  downstream
distribution  rights. Article  9  allows  competitors  to adopt  unified  forms  for
commercial  contracts  only if approved  by the Competition  Commission.  These
various categories of wrongdoing,  though stated in rather unusual terms,
presumably  could  be interpreted  to encompass  most of the  major  horizontal  and
vertical  restraints  of trade  commonly  addressed  by antimonopoly  regulation  in
industrialized  countries.  While  the law  is  all-encompassing,  it  adopts
explicitly  or implicitly  a "rule of reason"  approach  in most cases,  giving
virtually  unlimited  discretion  to  the  antimonopoly  office  to decide  which  cases
to  prosecute. Yet the  wording  implies  that  the  named  practices  are  Rrima  facie
illegal,  i.e.  that,  if  charged,  the  burden  of  proof  lies  with  the  company.  Given
the  imprecise  and somewhat  confused  wording  of the  law,  it  is likely  to  be  very
difficult  to know  in  practice  what is  permitted  and  what is  not.  Thus  there  is
tremendous  scope  for  misapplication,  which  would  do particular  harm if it  were
to stifle  legitimate  business  practices  in  the emerging  private  sector.
If any of these practices  are ruled anticompetitive,  the Competition
Commission  has  broad  powers  to  nullify  relevant  government  enactments  or  impose
sanctions  on offenders.  On it recommendation,  the Council  of Ministers  can
enforce  maximum  and/or  minimum  prices  on  the  monopoly  firm.  The  law  does  not  give
the  Office  the  authority  to  break  up  a firm  in  a  monopoly  position,  nor  does  the
office  have  the  authority  to  review  all  proposed  mergers  and  acquisitions  except
those  carried  out  by firms  that  are  already  in  a  monopoly  position  (Article  6).
Perhaps  the  biggest  problem  with  the  law  is  inherent  to  the  subject  itself;
even industrial  countries  have found  it  notoriously  difficult  to differentiate
a  restraint  of  trade  that  reduces  efficiency  from  a  leRitimate  business  deal  that
raises  efficiency  in  the  short-  or lona-run. Sophisticated  economic  analysis  in
the  U.S.  and  Europe  shows  that  many  vertical  restraints  (such  as  tying  of sales,
resale  price  maintenance,  refusals  to  deal,  discriminatory  pricing)  may  enhance
efficiency  under certain circumstances--typically  when market structure is
competitive  and  the  firms  imposing  the  restraints  are  not  in  a  dominant  position.
As a result  of this economic  analysis,  enforcement  of U.S. antitrust  law  has
softened  in the 19809,  and  the  Department  of Justice  refuses  to  prosecute  many
cases  it  would  have  brought  in  earlier  times. The  OECD  is  also  recommending  that
European  jurisdictions  relax  their  laws to look  at each case  on an individual
basis (the  "rule  of reason"  approach)  rather  than forbidding  certain  practices
under  all  circumstances  (the  "per  se"  approach).  Opponents  of  the  rule  of  reason
approach  argue that  businesses  need certainty  above  all, and that  the rule  of
reason  approach  leaves  too  much uncertainty  as to  what is  permitted  and  what is
not, and therefore  inhibits  business  activity.
Interpreting  and  applying  the  new  Bulgarian  law  effectively  is  an  enormous32
challenge,  particularly  given the lack of clarity  in the law itself  and the
broader set  of  problems with  antimonopoly  legislation  in  general.  The
enforcement  office  will need to tread lightly  at first.  As well as handling
ind'lvidual  complaints,  it should  concentrate  on its  other important  missions:
educating the public about the distortions  caused  by monopoly behavior  and
lobbying  the government  and Parliament  to minimize  barriers  to international
trade--the  most powerful  antimonopoly  force  of all.  Given the importance  of
industrial  structure  in  determining  monopoly  behavior,  the  office  should  also  be
given  a  mandate  to review  privatization  proposals  (as  is done  in  Poland)  to try
to stop  public  monopolies  from  becoming  private  ones.
Regulation  of Unfair  Comietition
Chapter  4  of  the  Law  bans  unfair  competition,  defined  at length  in  Article
12. Although  the  definition  is  very  broad,  specific  examples  focus  primarily  oc
misinformation--whether  misleading  advertising,  concealment  of deficiencies  il.
products,  circulation  of false  facts  about  competitors,  or  miuse  of trademark.
or brand names.  Also banned  more generally  is "non-compliance  with ...  a
contract...aimed  at concluding  a similar  contract  with a third  party",  if it
hurts  the  competitive  position  of  the  original  counterpart.  As  with  antimonopoly
regulation,  the  Bulgarians  must  be  careful  not  to  be too  overzealous  in  applying
these  restrictions,  lest  they  stifle  reasonable  competitive  behavior.
Judicial  Institutions
The  implementation  of  the  new  set  of  business-related  laws  discussed  above
will  be the  greatest  challenge  facing  the  judicial  system  in  Bulgaria  in  the  next
few  years. The  lack  of  judicial  experience,  if  not  dealt  with  adequately  through
technical  assistance  and  training,  could  prove  to  be  a  serious  obstacle  to  market
reforms.
The  Court  System
Under  socialism  the  judicial  system  was  not independent  but  was supposed
to serve  the goals of the state.  Although  central  control  over the judicial
system relaxed somewhat  in the mid- and late 1980s, local communist  party
committees continued to have decisive influence over the appointment  and
promotion  of  judges. Judges  in  courts  of  first  instance  had  greater  independence
than  those  in higher  positions.
Courts  in  Bulgaria  were  not involved  in  commercial  cases  during  socialist
times.  The  private  sector  was almost  non-existent,  and  disputes  between  state
enterprises  were dealt  with in speciali4ed  state  arbitration  boards  under the
Council  of Ministers. These  boards  have been dissolved,  and most arbitrators
have  joined  newly-created  commercial  sections  of  regular  courts. Unfortunately,
the experience  gained  by these  arbitrators--primarily  oriented  to implementing
the  central  plan--has  little  relevance  today. Not  only  is  the  subject  matter  of
future  commerical  litigation  likely  to  differ  markedly,  but  legal  procedures  are
likely  to differ  as  well.  In the  past  enterprises  had little  incentive  to  vin
a case,  and little  outside  evidence  was ever  used to resolve  disputes. Modern
principles  and  techniques  of litigation  were virtually  nonexistent.33
The  Bulgarian  court  system  is  still  organized  according  to the  provisions
of the  Constitution  of 1971,  although  it  will soon  be reorganized  to  comply  with
the  new  Constitution.  The  highest  judicial  body  is  the  Supreme  Court,  which  used
to  be  elected  by the  National  Assembly. It  has  three  chambers-Civilian,  Criminal
and Military.  Its important decisions are published and widely used by
practicing  lawyers  as references. Below the Supreme  Court are the District
courts,  and  below  them  are  the  Regional  (general)  courts. District  courts  have
appellate  jurisdiction  in  matters  covered  by the  regional  courts,  and  original
jurisdiction  in  certain  cases.  Time  and  training  is  needed  at  all  levels  of  the
court  system  to  develop  the  capacity  and  experience  to  handle  the  plethora  of  new
commercial  issues  emerging  as the  economy  moves  toward  a market  system.
Arbitration  could  be a useful  alternative  to court  procedures  ao a  means
to  resolve  commercial  disputes  among  private  parties.  As  in  other  CEE  countries,
the  Bulgarian  Chamber  of  Commerce  and  Industry  has  an  arbitration  commission  that
specialized  during  the  socialist  period  in  the  settlement  of international  trade
disputes. A broader  mandate  and  proper  technical  support  could  help this  body
develop  into  a  viable  alternative  means  for  dispute  resolution.  The legal  basis
for  private  arbitration  between  domestic  parties  is  unclear. Although  the  Code
of  Civil  Procedure  (Article  9)  restricts  private  arbitration  to  disputes  between
Bulgarian  and  foreign  persons,  Decree  56 (Article  98)  explicitly  allows  private
arbitration  between  domestic  parties  if  both parties  agree  in writing.  How a
decision  reached  pursuant  to  Decree  56  would  be executed  is,  however,  unclear.
Lawvers
As in  other  CEE  countries,  the  Bulgarian  legal  profession  was  divided  into
two  branches  during  the  socialist  period--lawyers  belonging  to  a  bar  association
(advocates)  and legal  advisers  within state  enterprises  (jurisconsults).  The
jurisconsults  handled virtually all commercially-related  legal work, while
lawyers  were not  generally  involved  in  commercial  areas. There  is  now somewhat
of a tug-of-war  between  these  two groups  as to who is the more qualified  to
emerge  as the  private  commercial  lawyer  of tomorrow.
Setting  up private  commercial  law  practice  has been allowed  in Bulgaria
since  1989,  and it  is indeed  beginning  on  a  modest  scale. However,  it is  still
subject to certain regulations  carried  over from the previous  regime.  For
example,  persons  with legal  training  may not appear  in court if they are  not
employed  by particular  enterprises  as "jurisconsults"  or are  not members  of a
particular  bar association. Passange  of the bar examination,  required  of all
legal  practitioners,  is  not synonomous  with  membership  in the  bar,  which until
recently  was  regulated  by the  state. Thus,  some  of  the  new  legal  firms  have  both
"solicitors"  with commercial  experience  and advocates  hired  primarily  because
they can appear in court.  On the other  hand,  many legal  and ethical  issues
surrounding  the  practice  of law in industrial  economies--such  as liability  for
advice given,  confidentiality,  and conflicts  of interest--have  not yet been
addressed.
Conclusion
The Bulgarian  government  is  working  steadily  to create  a legal  framework34
in which the private sector can develop.  Many now laws--including  a new
Constitution  and  now  laws  on  companies,  foreign  irsvestment,  and  competition--have
been adopted  over  the  past  2  years,  and  more are  now  being  drafted  and  debated.
Bulgaria's  pre-war  legal  framework  was quite  modern  for  its time,  and  most of
these  new laws  draw on pre-war  Bulgarian  tradition.
However,  the  administrative  and  judicial  machinery  for  implementing  those
laws  is slower  to develop.  Laws by themselves  are only paper; the legal
framework  will  "come  to  life"l  only  when  the  legal  and  administrative  institutions
can  enforce  the  laws  and  readily  resolve  the  disputes  that  they  inevitably  spur,
and  when the  public  accepts  that  the  laws  are  indeed  binding. Furthermore,  the
laws  are  by  necessity  general  frameworks  only. Their  content  needs  to  be filled
in  by  more  detailed  regulations  and  practice  in  individual  cases,  a  process  which
by necessity  takes  time.  The challenge  of legal  development  is as  immense  as
that  of economic  reform,  and  the  two  are  inexorably  intertwined.Policy Research Working Paper Series
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